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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)' requires federal
agencies to undergo consultation with either the Fish & Wildlife Service
(FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to insure that
agency actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered or threatened species or to result in adverse modification of
designated critical habitat.' This seemingly simple statutory instruction
has raised a storm of political controversy in the Pacific Northwest and has
resulted in attempts by both federal action agencies and the consulting
Services to avoid or circumvent the ESA's mandate.3
I. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
2. Id. § 1536(a)(2). Consultation is required with the "Secretary" referring to the Secretary of
the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce; however, the Secretaries have delegated their responsibili-
ties to the FWS and NMFS and this paper will refer to "the Services" where the statute refers to the
Secretaries. See also id. § 1532(15) (definition of Secretary); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (1991) (Joint
Regulations on Endangered Species).
3. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 301 (9th Cir. 1992) (U.S. Forest
Service (FS) attempted to argue that ESA listing relieved it of the duty to manage for spotted owl
viability under the National Forest Management Act (NFMA)). See also infra notes 184, 219 and
accompanying text (BLM attempts to reducescope of consultation). The FWS was reluctant to list the
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In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Supreme Court stated that
the intent of Congress in enacting the ESA "was to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost,'"4 and concluded that
the legislative history of section 7 revealed "a conscious decision by
Congress to give endangered species priority over the 'primary missions' of
federal agencies." Justice Powell criticized the Court's interpretation:
Under the Court's reasoning, the Act covers every existing
federal installation, including great hydroelectric projects and
reservoirs, every river and harbor project, and every national
defense installation-however essential to the Nation's eco-
nomic health and safety. The "actions" that an agency would be
prohibited from "carrying out" would include the continued
operation of such projects or any change necessary to preserve
their continued usefulness.6
Fifteen years later, the protection of the Snake River salmon looms over
"great hydroelectric projects," while the protection of the spotted owl
threatens to disrupt a large portion of the nation's timber supply, and the
mandate of the ESA remains essentially unchanged.
7
spotted owl, despite expert opinion that listing was warranted. It did so only after a court held that the
FWS decision not to list was "arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law" and ordered reconsidera-
tion of the decision. Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988). See
also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: SPOTTED OWL PETITION EVALUA-
TION BESET BY PROBLEMS (Feb. 21, 1989). When the FWS listed the owl, it did not designate critical
habitat and did not explain the basis for its decision not to do so, resulting in another finding of arbitrary
and capricious behavior. Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621,629 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
4. 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (preventing the impoundment of water behind the Tellico Dam in
order to protect the snail darter). Over $ 100 million had been invested in Tellico and the project was
virtually completed. See H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9460. The Tellico Dam was eventually filled because of an appropriations bill rider
which overode the ESA's protection and ordered the reservoir's completion. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater,
In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 805, 813 (1986).
5. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 185.
6. Id. at 203 (Powell, J., dissenting).
7. Section 7 was significantly amended after the Tellico controversy. Congress laid out explicit
procedures for consultation in attempt to avoid conflicts and require exploration of reasonable and
prudent alternatives, and in an attempt to introduce flexibility into the act, made provisions for
exemption from section 7s requirements under limited circumstances where the balance of benefits
favored an agency action over species protection. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751, 3752-60 (1978). See also H.R. REP. No. 1625, infra note 8.
However, the basic mandate of Section 7 remained unchanged, even after a 1979 amendment reduced
the burden on federal agencies from a requirement that they "insure" that their actions not jeopardize a
listed species or its habitat to a requirement that they "insure" that the action "is not likely" to have
such effect. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1979), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2576; Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. United States EPA, 684 F.2d
1041, 1048 (1982) (interpreting amended statute to still require agencies to prevent species loss by any
method, regardless of cost).
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Despite its clear mandate, the ESA does not present an automatic bar
to federal actions harmful to listed species. A widespread misconception
exists that in the absence of an exemption from the ESA's requirements, 8
section 7 of the ESA prevents all federal actions which are harmful to a
listed species. However, section 7 blocks only actions likely to "jeopardize"
a listed species or its designated critical habitat.9 The Services have
primary responsibility for determining whether an action will createjeopardy,' 0 so the effect of the "jeopardy" standard is to transfer a
considerable amount of decision-making authority from federal action
agencies to the consulting Services.
The limits of Service discretion, and the nature of the requirements
that are imposed through consultation, are subjects in which the public
often lacks knowledge and information. Consultation is not a public
process, and the Services normally do not have clearly defined or publicly
available standards for ESA compliance." As a result, examination of the
contents of biological opinions, which are themselves not widely availa-
ble,12 is essential to an understanding of the extent of Service discretion and
8. As a result of the 1978 amendments, the Endangered Species Committee (popularly known as
the "God Squad") may grant an exemption under Section 7(h) of the ESA, but the exemption process is
considered cumbersome because it is a public process requiring a good faith attempt to comply with
section 7, as well as findings of: necessity, a clear balance of benefits, and national or regional
significance. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-l (1988). See also H.R. REP. No. 1625,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9464.
9. Section 7 requires that agencies "insure" that agency action "is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary ... to be critical."
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988). The implementing regulations, in contrast to the statutory language
and legislative history, appear to place the burden on the Services. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 697,
supra note 7, at 12 (indicating that endangered species are to be given the benefit of the doubt and that
the burden is on the action agency to demonstrate compliance). The regulations define "jeopardize the
continued existence" of a listed species, to mean that the action must reasonably be expected "directly
or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in
the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02
(1992).
10. See supra note 2. The Service determination is only advisory, see infra note 166, but it is
usually given great weight, see infra note 255.
1I. Even when standards exist, as in the case of the owl, see infra section I11.A., the closed door
nature of consultation lends itself to inconsistency. See infra note 213 and accompanying text (BLM
allowed to violate FWS guidelines).
12. Biological Opinions are not published documents and are not easily obtained. Some sources
require formal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests; others do not require a FOIA request but
still charge thirteen cents per page; and yet some do provide free copies without hassles. However, the
major obstacle to obtaining opinions is that it is difficult to discover what opinions have been issued
because consultations are spread out through a number of offices in both the action agency and the
consulting Service. Even within individual offices, current lists of consultations which have been
conducted are often unavailable. In 1986, when amending the section 7 regulations, the Services
rejected a request to require publication of availability notices for biological opinions. See Interagency
Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973,51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,952 (1986) (as amended Final
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the nature of the requirements that are imposed through consultation. This
paper explores ways in which Service discretion is being exercised, as
reflected in biological opinions resulting from formal consultations con-
cerning the spotted owl and Snake River salmon.
Considering the economic stakes and high-level political opposition to
the ESA,13 it would not be surprising if the Services were reluctant to find
that a federal action would "jeopardize" the owl or the salmon. Such
reluctance would represent an effort to avoid political backlash against
both the ESA and the individuals who carried out its mandate. An initial
appraisal of some of the biological opinions which have been issued on the
owl and the salmon indicates that the consultation requirement has indeed
been ineffective. In the case of the owl, despite annual consultations on
hundreds of timber sales, and despite the fact that formal biological
opinions have been issued for over 1,650 sales, 4 FWS has issued jeopardy
opinions for only 52 individual timber sales, and has given numerous "no
jeopardy" opinions to sales which are in direct violation of accepted
conservation principles. 15 In the case of the salmon, NMFS ignored the
biological needs of the salmon by setting up an artificial "baseline" of
mortality that would occur if past operations were continued without
change, and accepting any decrease from that baseline as satisfying a 1992
"interim goal."'" Thus, without any assurances of increased numerical
survival, NMFS issued "no jeopardy" opinions on the salmon, despite
anticipating juvenile salmon mortality rates of as high as 82 percent,17 and
flows on the Snake river at only 24 to 46 percent of the levels recommended
by fishery agencies and tribes. 8 In fact, in the case of the owl, the courts
Rule) [hereinafter Interagency Cooperation Final Rule].
13. Before the owl was listed, Northwest politicians attempted to use appropriations riders to
relieve the FS and the BLM from responsibilities under other statutes to protect the owl. See, e.g.,
Departmentof the Interiorand Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990 § 318, Pub. L. No. 10I-
121, 103 Stat. 710 (1989) [hereinafter Section 318] (stating that management according to terms of
rider was sufficient to meet statutory requirements). Former Secretary of the Interior, Manuel Lujan,
has been a consistent advocate of weakening the ESA, SeeTed Gup, TheStealth Secretary, TIME, May
25, 1992, at 57. See also Art Pine, Logging Curbs to Protect Owl Ordered, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1992,
at A 16 (Administration proposal for alternative to owl recovery plan leading to extinction after 100
years). President Bush expressed opposition to reauthorization of the ESA stating that "[i]t is time to
make people more important than owls." Bill Dietrich, Political War of Words on the Woods: Bush
Calls for Jobs over Owls, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, at DI.
14. Biological Opinions only result from formal consultations, and formal consultations are
often not conducted either because the action agency determines that an action is not discretionary, see
infra note 162 and accompanying text, or because after informal correspondence and communication,
the Service gives a written concurrence to an action agency determination that an action is not likely to
adversely affect a listed species or critical habitat. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(b)(1) (1992).
15. See. e.g., infra notes 221, 251 and accompanying text.
16. See infra section IV.A.
17. See infra note 314 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 303 and accompanying text.
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have played a larger role in enforcing the ESA than have the Services;
courts have enjoined all timber sales of spotted owl habitat on Forest
Service (FS) and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands19 and
pending legal challenges may result in similar court enforcement of the
ESA in the case of the salmon. 0
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the biological opinions reveals that
the Services have used consultation to impose a patchwork of protective
measures, primarily through "incidental take" statements.2" Thus, instead
of blocking federal actions, the Services have attempted to strike a
compromise, accommodating federal actions involving severe harm to
listed species, but providing some species protection through imposition of
conditions requiring modification of the action to reduce the amount of
harm. 2 However, the Services have recognized these conditions as
insufficient for long-term species protection, and the Services have consist-
ently used biological opinions to warn action agencies that more severe
measures will be necessary in the future if current management practices
continue.2 3 Nevertheless, the conditions imposed by FWS have served as
significant roadblocks to individual actions, and have contributed to a
public perception that the ESA does not allow adequate consideration of
economic factors.
Section II of this paper introduces the background of the controversy
by introducing the ESA listings, the reasons for the listings, and the
implications of the salmon and the owl listings. Section III examines FWS'
approach to spotted owl consultations, and analyzes a sampling of
biological opinions issued by FWS to the FS and the BLM on timber sales.
Section IV examines the biological opinions issued by NMFS on the
operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) and on
19. See, e.g., Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992) (enjoining
BLM sales); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484 (9th Cir. 1992) (enjoining FS
sales).
20. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
21. "Incidental take" occurs when "takings" result from, "but are not the purpose of, an
otherwise lawful activity." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1992). "Take" means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(19) (1988). Whenever jeopardy is not found but incidental take is involved, the Service is
required to issue an incidental take statement which specifies (1) the impact of the taking, (2)
"reasonable and prudent measures" necessary or appropriate to minimize the impact of the taking, and
(3) "terms and conditions" with which a federal agency or other applicant must comply to implement
these measures." Id. § 1536(b)(4). Adherence to these measures and conditions allows "take" which
would otherwise be prohibited under section 9 of the ESA. See id. § 1536(o). Reasonable and prudent
measures and the terms and conditions implementing them are limited by the regulations and "cannot
alter the basic design, location, scope, duration, or timing of the action and may involve only minor
changes." 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(2) (1992) [hereinafter minor change rule].
22. See, e.g., infra notes 228, 326 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., infra notes 157, 323 and accompanying text.
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harvest of salmon. Section V concludes with some suggestions for improv-
ing the efficiency and effectiveness of consultation without revision of the
ESA by simply prodding the Services and action agencies into accepting
their statutory responsibilities.
II. ENDANGERED SPECIES ON STAGE, THE BACKGROUND OF THE
NORTHWEST'S ESA CONTROVERSY
The FWS listed the northern spotted owl as a threatened species on
June 22, 1990.24 The NMFS listed the Snake River sockeye salmon as an
endangered species on November 20, 1991,5 and, on April 22, 1992, listed
the Snake River spring/summer chinook and Snake River fall chinook as
threatened.26 Thirty days after listing, each of these species became subject
to the protection of the ESA, and most significantly, to the protection
afforded by section 7 of the ESA.
A. Species Status of the Spotted Owl
1. The Spotted Owl and the Old Growth Ecosystem
When the spotted owl was listed under the ESA as a threatened
species its precarious status was attributed to only one cause; the loss and
adverse modification of habitat.2 7 The spotted owl, which is found in
northern California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia, depends
on habitat with unique characteristics.
Habitats selected by northern spotted owls typically exhibit
moderate to high canopy closure; a multilayered, multispecies
canopy dominated by large overstory trees; a high incidence of
large trees with large cavities, broken tops, and other indications
of decadence; numerous large snags; heavy accumulations of logs
and other woody debris on the forest floor; and considerable open
space within and beneath the canopy. 8
These are primarily characteristics of old growth forests at least 150 to 200
years old, but may exist in younger forests, particularly where there are
24. Endangered & Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status for the
Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1990) (final rule) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17)
[hereinafter Owl Listing].
25. Endangered and Threatened Species; Endangered Status for Snake River Sockeye Salmon,
56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991) (final rule) [hereinafter Sockeye Listing].
26. Endangered and Threatened Species; Threatened Status for Snake River Spring/Summer
Chinook Salmon, Threatened Status for Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653
(1992) (final rule) [hereinafter Chinook Listing].
27. Owl Listing, supra note 24, at 26,114.
28. INTERAGENCY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE, A CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR THE NORTHERN
SPOTTED OWL 1 (1990) [hereinafter ISC REPORT].
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significant remnants of earlier stands.29 Old-growth is itself a threatened
resource; over 80 percent of it had been logged by the early 1980's, and
most of what remains is on federal lands.30 Of the estimated 7.1 million
acres of owl habitat remaining, approximately 94 percent is on federal
lands under the supervision of the FS, BLM and National Park Service
(NPS).a1 The Draft Recovery Plan for the spotted owl indicates that
suitable owl habitat on national forests is declining at an annual rate of one
to two percent, and that much of what remains is of lower quality than the
habitat which has been harvested.3 1 Spotted owl pairs have large median
home ranges, varying by physiographic province from a low of 1,411 acres
to a high of 14,271 acres; the median amounts of old-growth and mature
forest within these home ranges vary from 615 acres to 4,579 acres.38 The
survival of the owl depends on the preservation of chunks of old growth
characteristic forest large enough to support sustainable populations of
owls. Thus, the spotted owl issue is really an old growth ecosystem issue
because preservation of the owl will require preservation of ancient forests
of the Northwest. 4
2. Spotted Owl Conservation, Past and Future
The U.S. Department of the Interior included the spotted owl in a list
of potential candidates for ESA protection in 1973.-" Prior to its listing in
1990, the spotted owl was subject to a number of spotted owl management
plans which protected small islands of habitat.3 6 The Interagency Scienc-
tific Committee (ISC) and the FWS determined that the policy of
providing Spotted Owl Habitat Areas (SOHAs), habitat areas for single
pairs of owls, was ineffective due to inadequate size, low residency rates,
isolation, disturbances from adjacent logging activities, fragmentation
within SOHAs, and lack of contiguity with other suitable habitat.3 7 In
29. Id. at 19. The California coastal redwoods are the exception to this rule, there rapid regrowth
and abundant prey can produce suitable habitat in 40 to 60 years. Id.
30. MANUEL LUJAN JR. ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE
NORTHERN SPOTTED OwL-DRAFT 31 (1992) [hereinafter DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN].
31. Id. at 14-15.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 23-24.
34. The owl is an "indicator species" for the old growth ecosystem, and the effects of its
protection extend to other species of birds, mammals, invertebrates, and plants that are also dependent
on this ecosystem. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1992) (FS criteria for selecting indicator species under the
National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-87 (1988)).
35. See ISC REPORT, supra note 28, at 51, 58.
36. See generally id. at 17, 51-57 (protected areas were called SOHAs by the FS and BLM/
ODFW Agreement areas by the BLM, hereinafter both will be referred to as SOHAs).
37. DAVID. R. ANDERSON ET AL., FWS, 1990 STATUS REVIEW, NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL
Strix Occidentalis Caurina 54-55 (Apr. 30, 1990).
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addition, the ISC noted that habitat designated as suitable was often less
than 100 years old and thus could only be considered marginal habitat.
38
The ISC deemed the SOHA strategy to be a "prescription for the
extinction of spotted owls, at least in a large proportion of the owl's
range."39 Recent figures indicate that although there are still approxi-
mately 3,500 owl pairs, the population is declining more rapidly than
previously thought, and the rate of decline may be accelerating.4
In May 1990, the ISC published a document establishing guidelines
for management of federal lands, as well as making recommendations for
private and state lands.4 1 The ISC strategy recognized that suitable
habitat was declining, and called for the creation of a network of Habitat
Conservation Areas (HCAs) ranging in size from areas large enough to
support over fifty pairs of owls to areas only large enough to support a single
pair. The ISC called for these HCAs to be spaced within seven to twelve
miles of each other and connected by a forest matrix managed in such a
way as to provide adequate dispersal habitat between the areas.42 The
designated HCAs under the ISC strategy would contain approximately 7.7
million acres, 5.8 million of which would be outside of areas previously
protected from timber harvest because of wilderness or park designation.4
However, federal adoption of the ISC strategy would create new protection
on less than 2.4 million acres of currently suitable owl habitat.4 4 Under the
ISC strategy, owl habitat would continue to decline in the short-term, but
would eventually stabilize as currently unsuitable habitat within HCAs
and the forest matrix matured; the ISC estimated that if its strategy was
adopted, the owl population would not fall to below 40 percent of the
current level, even in a worst case analysis.4 "
Specifically, the ISC strategy called for creation of four types of
38. ISC REPORT, supra note 28, at 18.
39. Id. at 39.
40. DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 30, at 34-35, 328 (estimated rates of decline varying
from 7 to 16 percent with average annual decline of 7.5 percent).
41. ISC REPORT, supra note 28. The ISC urged participation by state and local landowners, but
the strategy only depended on compliance by federal landowners. U.S. FOREST SERVICE, QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS ON A CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL 27, 39 (Feb.
1991)[hereinafter ISC Q&A].
42. ISC REPORT, supra note 28, at 23-27.
43. Id. at 343.
44. Of the 5.8 million acres of new protection, 0.6 million acres would be on state land where
protection is discretionary, and the protected acreage included lakes, streams, roads, and meadows
which might never be suitable owl habitat. Id. Further, the ISC estimated that 40 percent (2.8 millon
acres) of the federal lands within the HCA's was cut over or in immature second-growth. See ISC
Q&A, supra note 41, at 15.
45. ISC REPORT, supra note 28, at 34-36. Even with these losses, the ISC expected the owl
population to stabilize at above 1200 pairs, a figure accepted as "marginally comfortable" in 1986 by
an Audubon Society panel. See id. at 31.
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HCAs: Category 1 HCAs, which would be capable of supporting 20 or
more pairs; Category 2 HCAs, which would be capable of supporting 2-19
pairs; Category 3 HCAs, which would be capable of supporting only one
pair; and Category 4 HCAs, which would aid dispersal and serve as
possible future nest sites.46 The ISC goal was to support a minimum of 20
pairs wherever possible because modeling indicated that, even if isolated, a
population of 15 to 20 pairs would have a moderate to high likelihood of
persistence for 50 years and a moderate likelihood of persistence for 100
years.47 Likelihood of persistence would be improved under the ISC plan
by increasing the chances for successful dispersal; thus, the maximum
distance between Category 1 HCAs was set at twelve miles and the
maximum distance between the smaller and more vulnerable HCAs was
set at seven miles.48
Successful dispersal is an important part of the ISC plan. Under the
plan, dispersal is dependent upon the management of the general forest
matrix between HCAs to a "50-11-40" rule, which requires 50 percent of
the forest matrix to be maintained in stands with a mean diameter breast
height (d.b.h.) of 11 inches or greater and with at least a 40 percent canopy
closure.49 In addition, 80 acre cores (Category 4 HCAs) would be
established within mile of up to seven known owl pairs per township. 0 In
some areas of concern, 5 additional Category 3 HCAs would be established
outside of Category 1 and 2 HCAs which failed to meet target occupancy. 5
In April 1992, the Department of the Interior released a draft
recovery plan for the spotted owl, based largely upon the ISC strategy.53
The draft recovery plan called for a network of Designated Conservation
Areas (DCAs) connected by a forest matrix managed to the 50-11-40 rule,
supplemented with additional protection for pairs and territorial singles in
some areas through provision of residual habitat areas. 4 On the issue of
46. Id. at 315.
47. Id. at 24.
48. Id. at 26. Dispersal is usually in the form of movement of juveniles from their natal area; the
twelve and seven mile distances represent figures within the known dispersal ranges of 66 percent and
75 percent, respectively, of observed owls. Id. at 25.
49. Id. at 310.
50. Id.
51. The ISC recognized ten areas of special concern: North Cascades, North Cascades East,
Olympic Peninsula, Southwestern Washington, Columbia River, Oregon Coast Range, Southern
Deschutes, Shasta McCloud Area, North Coastal California, and Mendocino National Forest. Special
concern was warranted in these areas either because the ability to support owls was limited or because
the area served as a dispersal link between other regions. Important factors included low owl density,
scarce owl habitat, isolation due to geological and manmade factors, and poor habitat quality. Id. at 66-
68.
52. Id. at 323.
53. DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 30, at 107, 120-25.
54. Id.
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section 7 consultation, the draft recovery plan called for programmatic
consultations on issues related to implementation of the recovery plan,
combined with an intensive monitoring program . 5 The draft recovery plan
would thus eliminate the need to conduct site-specific consultations and
obtain site-specific incidental take permits, so long as significant new
information is not discovered.56 Like the ISC strategy, the success of the
draft recovery plan depends on rapid adoption by federal agencies. 7
3. Potential Costs of Owl Protection
Estimates of the costs of implementing a strategy for conservation of
the spotted owl vary dramatically with timber interests predicting eco-
nomic disaster, while others argue that economic impacts will be minor and
that much of the decline in timber industry employment is a result of
automation and raw log exports as well as past mismanagement.5 8 Most
timber industry and federal timber management agency studies predict
that an owl conservation plan could be expected to reduce federal timber
harvests by about 1.7 billion board feet per year and result in annual
income losses of around $500 million.5 9 These figures are based on
implementation of a strategy which does not involve preserving all
remaining old-growth, and which could result in a 50 to 60 percent
reduction in the owl population. 0
Nationwide, the economic effects of even radical protection would be
small. According to a FS study, protection of all remaining owl habitat on
FS lands would be expected to add only $630 to the cost of building a
55. Id. at 128.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 127, 137.
58. See Ted Gup, Owl vs Man, TIME, June 25, 1990, at 56; Bill Dietrich, Study: State Can
Protect Owl and Keep Logging, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 25, 1992, at B2. See also JEFFERY T. OLSON,
WILDERNESS SOC'Y & NAT'L WILDLIFE ASS'N, NATIONAL FORESTS POLICES FOR THE FUTURE VOL. 4:
PACIFIC NORTHWEST LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS: AN INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION (1988)
(predicting large declines in timber related employment even in the absence of ancient forest
preservation and indicating that preservation could be accomplished with minimal impacts on
employment); Testimony of W. Ed Whitelaw, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Environmental
Protection, Committee on Environment & Public Works (May 13, 1992).
59. See DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 30, at 544-46; see also Edward Madigan, U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture, Final Environmental Impact Statement on Management for the Northern
Spotted Owl in the National Forests §§ 3-4, at 186 (1992) [hereinafter FS FEIS] (estimating
reduction of income of $926 million from baseline of projected harvest under previous management
plan).
60. ISC REPORT, supra note 28, at 34. The ISC Strategy did call for 7.7 million acres within
Habitat Conservation Areas (HCAs), but much of this was not suitable habitat. See supra note 44 and
accompanying text. The adequacy of the ISC strategy has also been brought into question by new
information discovered after the release of the ISC Report which indicates that the spotted owl
population is declining more rapidly than previously thought and that the rate of decline may be
accelerating. DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 30, at 328.
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$100,000 home."' However, many people are afraid that the economic
effects would be concentrated and devastating to many of the small timber-
dependent communities of the Northwest, where timber intrests have
attempted to characterize the issue as "jobs vs. owls." 2
B. Species Status of the Snake River Salmon
The Snake River salmon are dependent on the Columbia and Snake
River ecosystems for transportation to and from the ocean and on the
Snake River ecosystem for spawning and juvenile development habitat.68
Unfortunately, the natural ecosystems of the Columbia Basin have been
replaced by an artificial "multiple use" managed system of dams and
reservoirs.64 Many of these dams, including the eight through which the
Snake River salmon must pass,65 are federally owned and operated, and are
thus directly accountable under section 7 of the ESA.66
1. Snake River Sockeye
The Snake River sockeye salmon, listed as endangered on November
20, 1991, once spawned plentifully in five or more lakes, but its spawning is
61. FS FEIS, supra note 59, §§ 3-4, at 175.
62. See, e.g., Margaret E. Kriz, Jobs v. Owls, 23 NAT'L J. 2913 (Nov. 30, 1991); Ted Gup, Owl
vs Man, TIME, June 25, 1990, at 56. However, the owl controversy can be seen as merely hastening an
inevitable change in the timber industry because, at current rates of exploitation, the last of the old-
growth forests outside of designated wilderness areas would be harvested within 30 years. Id. at 58.
Further, federal harvest reductions would lead to increased private harvest and reductions in raw log
exports which would partially offset job losses due to federal reductions. See Bill Dietrich, Study: State
Can Protect OwlandKeep Logging, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 25, 1992, at B2. Although sacrificing theowl
would result in a "small short-run increase in timber jobs," it would also result in a "large long-run
decrease in non-timber jobs." Testimony of W. Ed. Whitelaw, supra note 58, at 1.
63. See Sockeye Listing, supra note 25, at 58,619-20; NMFS, FACTORS FOR DECLINE: A
SUPPLEMENT TO THE NOTICE OF DETERMINATION FOR SNAKE RIVER SPRING/SUMMER CHINOOK
SALMON UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 4-17 (1991); NMFS, FACTORS FOR DECLINE: A
SUPPLEMENT TO THE NOTICE OF DETERMINATION FOR SNAKE RIVER FALL CHINOOK SALMON UNDER
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 3-12 (1991).
64. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY ET AL., THE COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM: THE INSIDE STORY 2-8
(1991 ) [hereinafter INSIDE STORY]. The system supplies over 75 percent of the Northwest's electrical
generation and produces an annual average of 18,500 megawatts of electricity, but it is used for a
number of other purposes as well, including the diversion of six percent of the basin's water for
irrigation. Id. at 2-6.
65. Bonneville, The Dalles, John Day, McNary, Ice Harbor, Lower Monumental, Little Goose,
and Lower Granite. See NMFS, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT SECTION 7 CONSULTATION/CONFER-
ENCE BIOLOGICAL OPINION: 1992 OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM
figures 1, 2 (Apr. 10, 1992) [hereinafter FCRPS OPINION]. See also INSIDE STORY, supra note 64, at
I I (listing dams and management agencies).
66. Even non-federal hydroelectric projects can be affected by section 7 because they are subject
to licensing provisions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). See. e.g., Sockeye
Listing, supra note 25, at 58,623.
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now limited to Redfish Lake,67 and its returns have been dismal in recent
years. The Snake River sockeye enter the Columbia River during June and
July, arrive at Redfish Lake primarily in August, and spawn in October.68
The eggs hatch in the spring and juveniles remain in the lake for one to
three years before starting the 900-mile migration to the sea which begins
in late April or May.69 The Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG)
counted only twelve returning adult sockeye in 1985, twenty-nine in 1986,
sixteen in 1987, four in 1988, one in 1989, and none at all in 1990. When
three males and one female returned in 1991, they were captured for an
emergency captive breeding program.70
2. Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook
The Snake River spring/summer7 1 chinook, listed as threatened on
April 22, 1992, historically returned in runs consisting of over 1.5 million
fish.72 However, by the 1950s, the total run had decreased to an average of
125,000 per year, and the 1991 total count was 17,149, with the "wild"
return estimated at only 8,457.71 Current abundance of Snake River
spring/summer chinook is at 0.5 percent of its historical level,7 4 and the
NM FS has estimated that the population is declining at a rate of five to six
percent per year, or approximately 25 percent per generation.75 Spring/
summer chinook migrate upriver past Bonneville Dam from March
through July, after spending two or three years in the ocean. Juvenile
yearling smolts begin their migration to the sea from April through June. 6
Although still counted in the thousands, these stocks are dispersed over a
wide geographic area and are further separated by run time differences,
which may result in localized risk of inbreeding, difficulty of finding
spawning mates, and susceptibility to other random factors.77
67. Sockeye Listing, supra note 25, at 58,622.
68. FCRPS Opinion, supra note 65, at 11, 12.
69. Id. at 12.
70. Id. Some of the outmigrating juveni!es were also captured in 1991 and are being reared to
provide broodstock for future sockeye production. Sockeye Listing, supra note 25, at 58,622.
71. The spring and summer chinook are treated as separate stocks for management purposes due
to differences in life histories and runtiming, but NMFS decided to treat them as a single Evolutionarily
Significant Unit (ESU) because of genetic similarities and uncertainty in distinguishing between the
stocks. Chinook Listing, supra note 26, at 14,654.
72. Id. at 14,659.
73. Id. The total count includes both hatchery produced and "wild" or "natural" salmon, but
only the natural stocks have been listed under the ESA. See id. at 14,662-63.
74. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 13.
75. NMFS, AD Hoc COMMITTEE REPORT ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY DECREASES IN MORTALI-
TIES NECESSARY TO STABILIZE SNAKE RIVER CHINOOK SALMON POPULATIONS 3 (Apr. 2, 1992)
[hereinafter STABILIZATION REPORT], reprinted in FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at app. I.
76. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 12-13.
77. Chinook Listing, supra note 26, at 14,659.
1993]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
3. Snake River Fall Chinook
NMFS also listed the Snake River fall chinook as threatened on April
22, 1992.78 Historically, the fall chinook were widely distributed through-
out the Snake River and many of its tributaries, and were found as far
upstream as Shoshone Falls, Idaho, 615 miles from the Snake River's
confluence with the Columbia River.7 9 The fall chinook were obstructed
from a significant portion of their spawning grounds as early as 1901, but
the chinook population stabilized at around 72,000 between 1928 and
1949.80 However, during the 1950s the fall chinook return fell to 29,000
and continued to fall as new dams inundated their spawning areas and
further obstructed fish passage. 1 Only 102 miles of the Snake River are
now available to the fall chinook, and wild escapement has fallen to 295 in
1989, 78 in 1990, and 318 in 1991.82 Like the spring/summer chinook, the
population of fall chinook is declining at approximately 25 percent per
generation. Snake River fall chinook begin their migration upriver past
Bonneville Dam during August and October and spawn during October
and November.8 4 Spawning occurs along the mainstem of the Snake River
from the Lower Granite Dam to Hells Canyon Dam, and also in the lower
reaches of the Imnaha, Grande Ronde, Clearwater, and Tucannon
Rivers.8 Juveniles emerge from the gravel in March and April, and
downstream migration begins within several weeks. But the seaward
movement is slow. Juveniles may be found behind Lower Granite Dam
through June and in the lower Columbia River from June to October.8 6
Adults return to spawn between the ages of two and five, but four is the
most common age.8 7
78. Id. at 14,654. Only natural stocks are protected. Id. at 14,663.
79. Id. at 14,659.
80. Id. at 14,654-60.
81. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 14. The construction of Brownlee Dam, Oxbow Dam,
and Hells Canyon Dam during the period between 1958 and 1967 eliminated access to the middle
Snake Basin which contained its primary production areas, and habitat was further reduced by
construction of Ice Harbor Dam, Lower Monumental Dam, Little Goose Dam, and Lower Granite
Dam. Id.
82. Chinook Listing, supra note 26, at 14,660.
83. STABILIZATION REPORT, supra note 75, at 3.
84. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 14.
85. Id.
86. ROBIN S. WAPLES ET AL., NMFS, STATUS REVIEW FOR SNAKE RIVER FALL CHINOOK
SALMON 10-11 (1991).
87. Id. at 11.
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4. Historical Decline of Columbia River Basin Anadromous Fish
a. ESA Listings: A New Approach to an Old Problem
The listing of the Snake River sockeye salmon in 1991 and the Snake
River spring/summer and fall chinook in 1992 did not signal recognition of
a new problem; the listings resulted from Columbia River Basin problems
that have been recognized for decades. Historically, the anadromous fish
runs88 of the basin numbered up to 16 million fish, but by the 1970s the runs
decreased to around 2.5 million fish.89 The anadromous fish of the
Columbia Basin have varying life cycles and are in varying states of
depression, but their condition is attributable to a number of common
factors. Most notably, the dramatic declines in anadromous fish returns is
due to the development and operation of hydropower on the Columbia and
Snake Rivers. 90 Hydropower-related losses have been estimated at five to
eleven million fish annually.9 '
Recognition of depleted and declining returns led the NMFS and the
FWS to initiate a status review of upriver Columbia Basin salmon in
1978.92 However, the Services suspended the status review in the wake of
the passage of the Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act (NWPA), 93 which was intended to result in the treatment of fish and
wildlife as "co-equal" with hydropower.9" Unfortunately, the NWPA
failed to reverse or even halt the decline of most salmon stocks, leading the
NMFS to conclude that "the NWPA has not achieved positive results for
88. "Anadromous fish" are species of fish, including salmon and steelhead trout, which hatch in
freshwater, migrate to saltwater as juveniles, reach adulthood at sea, and return to freshwater to
reproduce. "Fish Runs" consist of returning adult fish, including those which are harvested before
reaching the river. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HYDROELECTRIC DAMS: ISSUES SURROUND-
ING COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN JUVENILE FISH BYPASSES 8 (1990) [hereinafter JUVENILE BYPASSES].
89. COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE AUTH., INTEGRATED SYSTEM PLAN FOR SALMON AND
STEELHEAD PRODUCTION IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 11 (1991) [hereinafter SYSTEM PLAN].
90. Id. See also Michael C. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific
Northwest's Anadromous Fish for a Peaceful Coexistence With the Columbia River Power System,
II ENVTL. L. 211 (1981).
91. See SYSTEM PLAN, supra note 89, at II. See also JUVENILE BYPASSES, supra note 88, at 8-10
(estimating 80 percent decline since the 1930s with hydropower alone responsible for a 60 percent
decline and other factors such as irrigation, flood control, logging, and farming responsible for a 20
percent decline).
92. NMFS & FWS, Upper Columbia River Basin Populations of Salmon (Oncorhynchus Spp.)
and Steelhead (Salmo Gairdneri) Biological Status Review, 43 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (1978) (Notice of
Review).
93. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94
Stat. 2697 (Dec. 5, 1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1988)).
94. See H.R. REP. No. 976,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5989, 6015. See also Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unraveling of the Parity Promise:
Hydropower, Salmon, and EndangeredSpecies in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL. L. 657,660 (1991).
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the survival of anadromous fish." 95 NMFS attributed this failure to a lack
of specificity in NWPA measures which lead to disagreements over their
implementation, and to the fact that compliance with the NWPA's Fish
and Wildlife Program (FWP) measures was not mandatory.96
Listing of the Snake River salmon thus follows more than a decade of
conservation efforts and indicates that enforceable measures and more
rigorous efforts are needed. New measures improving flow and passage
conditions will benefit not only the three species that have been listed, but
other anadromous fish stocks which, although depressed, have not yet
qualified for ESA listing, or are considered ineligible for listing due to
mixed stock or non-native origins. Thus, the listed salmon may act as
indicator species for the Columbia River Basin ecosystem, just as the
spotted owl does for old growth forests.
b. Past Recognition of Needed Enhancement Measures
NMFS is a member of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Authority (CBFWA) which has repeatedly stressed the importance of
increased flows, installation of effective bypass facilities for both migrating
juveniles and adults, and management of the hydropower system to reflect
fishery needs.98 In its listing decisions on the Snake River salmon, NMFS
cited a number of common factors contributing to the decline and
representing a continuing threat to the existence of the salmon, including
hydropower development, water withdrawal and diversions, water storage,
disease and predation, harvest, and inadequate regulatory mechanisms. 9'
Most of these factors fall under the broad sweep of section 7's definition of
federal action and thus must be considered in NMFS consultations. 00
95. Endangered and Threatened Species; Proposed Endangered Status for Snake River Sockeye
Salmon; 56 Fed. Reg. 14,055, 14,061 (1991) (proposed Apr. 5, 1991) [hereinafter Sockeye Proposal].
96. Id. See also Blumm & Simrin, supra note 94 (discussing the NWPA, the program
promulgated under it, and the failure of that program).
97. The NMFS does not consider a salmon stock to be a "species" under the ESA unless it
represents an evolutionarily significant unit (ESU). To be considered an ESU the stock must be 1)
"substantially reproductively isolated," and 2) "an important component of the evolutionary legacy of
the species." Policy on Applying the Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 56 Fed.
Reg. 58,612, 58,612 (1991 ) (Notice of Policy). This definition resulted in a determination not to list the
Lower Columbia River coho salmon due to transfers of other coho stocks into the region for hatchery
purposes. See Endangered and Threatened Species, Lower Columbia River Coho Salmon, 56 Fed.
Reg. 29,553 (1991) (Notice of Determination).
98. See, e.g., NMFS ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
PROTECTION, MITIGATION, AND ENHANCEMENT OF ANADROMOUS FISH IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER
BASIN (1981); COLUMBIA BASIN FISH & WILDLIFE AUTH., PROPOSED MAINSTEM FLOWS FOR
COLUMBIA BASIN ANADROMOUS FISH (1990) [hereinafter PROPOSED FLOWS].
99. Sockeye Listing, supra note 25, at 58,622; Chinook Listing, supra note 26, at 14,660.
100. Section 7 applies to "any action authorized, funded, or carried out" by a federal agency. 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988). See also 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1992).
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Hydropower plays an important part in most of the adverse conditions
faced by the salmon. Hydropower disrupts the natural flow conditions
under which the salmon evolved, imposes migration barriers, and creates
ideal conditions for predator species. Other than direct flooding and
obstruction of habitat, the most significant effect of the dams may be the
disruption of natural flow patterns. The salmon evolved under conditions of
high spring flows which would flush juvenile salmon (smolts) downriver to
the ocean, and the dams have resulted in a series of reservoirs which have a
high cross-sectional area resulting in low water velocities. 1 1 Water
velocity is further reduced by the storage of spring and summer runoff in
upper river storage reservoirs for release during the fall and winter
months.0 2 Because of the dams, a migration that once took 22 days can
now take over 50 days.103
Smolt migration is largely passive and thus dependent on water
velocity.104 Any delay in migration exposes the smolts to escalating
predation due to continued exposure to predator species which become
more voracious as summer temperatures increase. 0 5 Further, delays may
result in arrival at the rivers estuary outside of the "biological window" in
which smolt survival and adaptation to salt water is likely.'06 The CBFWA
has proposed minimum average flows as high as 140 kcfs (thousand cubic
feet per second) on the Snake River and 300 kcfs on the lower Columbia
during peak periods of juvenile migration. 0 7 NMFS has determined that
"there is a relationship between increased flows, decreased fish travel time,
and increased survival,"' 08 and has cited as a factor in the failure of the
NWPA the fact that the Northwest Power Planning Council (NWPPC)
has provided inadequate flows "well below the flow levels identified by the
fishery agencies and tribes as needed for passage."109
Dam passage is another major factor impacting juvenile salmon
mortality. There are several ways in which juveniles can pass through
dams; they can pass over a spillway, through a trash sluiceway, through a
juvenile bypass system, or through the turbines of the dam. NMFS
101. COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE AUTH., THE BIOLOGICAL AND TECHNICAL JUSTIFI-
CATION FOR THE FLOW PROPOSAL OF THE COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE AUTH. 1 (1991)
[HEREINAFTER FLOW PROPOSAL JUSTIFICATION].
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 9-10.
105. Id. at 12-20.
106. Id. at 15-20.
107. Id. at 44 (comprehensive table of annual fish flow recommendations).
108. Chinook Listing, supra note 26, at 14,655.
109. Sockeye Proposal, supra note 95, at 14,062. See also id. at 14,058. However, N MFS later
stated that it did not intend the cite to imply that "a specific flow level is required to meet a future
recovery standard." Sockeye Listing, supra note 25, at 58,619.
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estimates that turbine mortality is approximately ten to nineteen percent
and that the other paths result in mortality of one to three percent. 1 ' Spill
can be used to reduce the number of fish passing through the turbines, but
this results in lost power production opportunity, and the proportion of fish
that pass over spillways is directly related to the volume of water that is
spilled."' Bypass systems are nonexistent or ineffective at some of the
dams." 2 As a result, since 1988 varying amounts of spill have been
provided through a Fish Spill Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
between the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and the fishery
agencies and tribes."13
In the past, juvenile mortality problems have been addressed by
collecting juveniles at the upriver dams and trucking or barging them to the
lower river in an atteimpt to reduce both indirect travel-related losses and
direct dam passage losses."" In its document listing the Snake River
chinook, NMFS indicated a belief that there is substantial benefit in
transporting chinook salmon instead of allowing them to migrate "through
adverse in-river conditions.""115 However, studies have not been conducted
on Snake River sockeye, and NMFS has acknowledged that for some
species the benefit of transportation is unclear.11
Hydropower has also had adverse effects on returning adult salmon,
primarily due to migration delay and to fallback through turbines. 1 7 The
110. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 31. Mortality varies by species and these figures are
based on incomplete data. Id. Other sources indicate that turbine mortality may vary from ten to thirty
percent. JUVENILE BYPASSES, supra note 88, at 18.
Ill. N MFS, FACTORS FOR DECLINE: A SUPPLEMENT TO THE NOTICE OF DETERMINATION FOR
SNAKE RIVER SPRING/SUMMER CHINOOK SALMON UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 47 (June
1991).
112. Id. at 46-47.
113. Id. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) was opposed to and did not sign the MOA
but did agree to implement the program "as long as there are no unacceptable impacts." See JUVENILE
BYPASSES, supra note 88, at 19 (discussing delays in installation of fish bypasses due to COE opposition
to the projects).
114. See, e.g., Chinook Listing, supra note 26, at 14,657. However, only 50-70 percent of the fish
are collected at each collector dam, and in years where flows have exceeded 100 kcfs,juveniles collected
below Lower Granite Dam have been allowed to migrate naturally. Id.
115. Chinook Listing, supra note 26, at 14,657. NMFS has limited transportation programs in
years in which Snake River flows have exceeded 100 kcfs and has acknowledged that "transportation is
not to be considered an exclusive long-term solution and should not be viewed as a replacement for
healthy in-river migratory conditions." FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 25.
116. Sockeye Proposal, supra note 95, at 14,058.
117. Migration is delayed at each dam because the s2'mon must find the fish ladder. When good
passage conditions exist, average per-project delays are one to three days on the lower Columbia River
and one to two days on the lower Snake River. During periods of high spill, delays on the Snake River
can be as high as five to seven days per project. These delays can be fatal because migrational delays of
as little as three to four days have been associated with prespawning mortality in sockeye. Fallback of
adults also results in mortality; where adults pass through a dam's turbines mortality is estimated at 22
to 41 percent. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 34.
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NMFS has estimated that within the FCRPS, cumulative total adult
passage losses, from all causes except legal harvest, are 18.5 percent for
sockeye, 65.8 percent for fall chinook, and 35 percent for spring/summer
chinook. 118
Historic levels of harvest have also been recognized as factors behind
the decline of the species. NMFS has estimated that harvest rates of
spring/summer chinook have exceeded 80 percent of the run in the past,
and that the current harvest rate for fall chinook is 69 percent. 119 Harvests
of sockeye and spring/summer chinook have been greatly reduced in
recent years in attempts to protect these runs, and the NMFS believes that
the primary area of concern for these species is the Lower Columbia River
net fisheries.120 Fall chinook have still been subject to significant ocean and
in-river harvests in recent years; an estimated 48 percent are harvested at
sea, and 55 percent of those that return are harvested in-river in
commercial, recreational, and tribal fisheries. 2 '
5. Potential Costs of Salmon Protection
Although there are no official proposals to eliminate the mainstem
dams, drastic changes in operations such as reservoir drawdowns, flow
augmentation, and implementation of fish flows as hard constraints on
system operations are being considered. 22 A 1992 environmental impact
statement prepared by the Core of Engineers (COE) indicates that
drawdowns and flow augmentation could result in agricultural damage and
lost electrical power at a cost of approximately $500 million in the first year
of implementation. 23 Losses would be almost entirely regional, but could
be devastating to many in agriculture and in power-intensive industries
such as aluminum production.
118. Id. at 29.
119. Chinook Listing, supra note 26, at 14,660.
120. See Chinook listing, supra note 26, at 14,660; Sockeye Proposal, supra note 95, at 14,059.
121. N MFS, FACTORS FOR DECLINE: A SUPPLEMENT TO THE NOTICE OF DETERMINATION FOR
SNAKE RIVER FALL CHINOOK SALMON UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 15-17 (June 1991).
122. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ET AL., 1992 COLUMBIA RIVER SALMON FLOW
MEASURES OPTIONS ANALYSiS/ETS (1992) [hereinafter FLOW MEASURES]. See also PROPOSED
FLOWS, supra note 98 (flow recommendations with peak flows during juvenile migration).
123. See FLOW MEASURES, supra note 122, § 4. These figures are for one year only.
Agricultural losses in subsequent years could be greatly reduced by pump modifications. Id. at 142.
Similarly, costs associated with electrical generation are due primarily to power production during
non-peak demand times, and these costs could be reduced through power exchanges and through
marketing strategy changes to reshape demand. See Blumm & Simrin, supra note 94, at 729.
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III. CONSULTATIONS ON THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL
A. FWS Guidelines for ESA Compliance
Shortly after listing the spotted owl, the FWS published guidelines to
aid federal, state, and private entities in achieving ESA compliance.
12 4
These guidelines were in effect until October of 1991 and should have been
reflected in biological opinions issued before that date. The guidelines
accepted the ISC Conservation Strategy 125as "a conservation goal against
which all future actions will need to be measured," and noted that a new
strategy might be required if the ISC strategy was not "implemented in full
prior to contracting 1991 sales."'26
The guidelines established a standard for federal agencies to use in
determining whether actions required consultation and whether an action
would involve incidental take of listed species. 117 The FWS believed that
timber harvest activities within suitable owl habitat or within a half mile
radius of any known nest site or pair activity center triggered the "may
affect" standard of the ESA section 7 regulations,' 28 and that federal
agencies should initiate formal consultation for any such action. 2 9 The
FWS noted that incidental take due to harm and harassment from habitat
removal was difficult to assess, and recommended case by case determina-
tions through dialogue with the Service. 30 However, the FWS did issue
guidelines for avoiding take, and stated that if the guidelines were
followed, the FWS would not seek prosecution for incidental take. 3 1 These
guidelines for avoiding incidental take called for (1) conducting owl
surveys during the breeding season and prior to harvest; (2) avoiding
harvest activity which would result in less than seventy acres of the best
available owl habitat surrounding the nest site and/or activity center of a
124. FWS, PROCEDURES LEADING TO ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT COMPLIANCE FOR THE
NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL (July 1990) [hereinafter PROCEDURES FOR COMPLIANCE]. These guide-
lines were primarily interpretive, explaining duties and procedures required under the ESA, but the
FWS also presented detailed "take" guidelines and stated that it intended to use the guidelines'
standards as the basis for enforcement decisions. Id. at 9.
125. See supra section II.A.2.
126. PROCEDURES FOR COMPLIANCE, supra note 124, at 5.
127. For an explanation of "incidental take" see supra note 21.
128. The "may affect standard" refers to the regulatory requirement that "each federal agency
shall review its actions at the earliest possible time to determine whether any action may affect listed
species or critical habitat." 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (1992). Consultation is necessary whenever it is
determined that there is a possible effect. Id. However, under the regulations, only actions where
federal involvement or control is "discretionary" is subject to the requirements of section 7, id.
§ 402.03, and formal consultation which results in a biological opinion is not required if the Service
concurs with an action agency determination that the action is not likely to adversely affect a listed
species or critical habitat. Id. § 402.14(b)(1).
129. PROCEDURES FOR COMPLIANCE, supra note 124, at 3.




spotted owl pair; (3) avoiding harvest which would result in less than 500
acres of suitable habitat within a 0.7 mile radius (1000 acres) of a nest site
and/or activity center; and (4) avoiding harvest activity which would
result in less than forty percent coverage of suitable owl habitat within an
owl's median home range radius.'1 2
These "Procedures for Compliance" guidelines were rescinded with-
out explanation on October 2, 1991.133 However, they are still important
because they have not yet been replaced. In addition, they were in effect
during the great majority of the consultations which have occurred to date
and should have been reflected in those consultations.
B. Early Owl Opinions
Four major consultations resulted in "no jeopardy" biological opin-
ions shortly after the designation of the Northern Spotted Owl as
threatened. These opinions covered timber sales by the FS and the BLM
that were undertaken under the auspices of Section 318 of the 1990
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act13 4
(318 sales), and timber sales made prior to Section 318 which were under
contract but unharvested (pre-318 sales). Each of the opinions involved a
number of separate timber sales, but the consultations were conducted on a
programmatic basis. The four opinions covered a total of 1,075 individual
sales. Although FWS gave somewhat different reasons in each case, all
four opinions reached the conclusion that "timber sales subject to this
consultation will adversely affect the northern spotted owl through loss and
increased fragmentation of habitat, but are not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of the subspecies."' 1 5 These opinions, and the reason-
ing behind them are discussed below.
1. The Pre-318 Opinions
The FWS issued the biological opinion on the FS pre-318 sales on July
23, 1990. Almost three months latter, on October 5, 1990, it issued the
132. Id. at 10-11.
133. Memorandum from H. Dale Hall, Assistant Regional Director-Fish and Wildlife
Enhancement, FWS, to Field Supervisors (Oct. 2, 1991).
134. See supra note 13.
135. FWS, FORMAL CONSULTATION ON BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT TIMBER SALES
AWARDED PRIOR TO THE SECTION 318 TIMBER SALE PROGRAM 2 (Oct. 5, 1990) [hereinafter BLM
PRE-318 OPINION]. See also FWS, FORMAL CONSULTATION ON BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
SECTION 318 TIMBER SALES 2 (Nov. 23, 1990) [hereinafter BLM 318 OPINION]; FWS, FORMAL
CONSULTATION ON U.S. FOREST SERVICE TIMBER SALES AWARDED PRIOR TO THE SECTION 318
TIMBER SALE PROGRAM 2 (July 23, 1990) [hereinafter FS PRE-318 OPINION]; FWS, FORMAL
CONSULTATION ON THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE SECTION 318 TIMBER SALE PROGRAM (July 23, 1990)
[hereinafter FS 318 OPINION].
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opinion on the BLM pre-318 sales. The opinions closely resemble each
other. Both opinions concerned unharvested sales which the agencies had
awarded before the owl's listing became effective. FWS' reasoning for the
"no jeopardy" decisions was similar, and the incidental take restrictions
were very limited. Both opinions stated that their goal was to "assist in
preserving management options based on conservation biology." 136
The only real difference between the opinions issued by the FWS was
that the opinion issued to the FS concerned 203 timber sales, while the
opinion issued to the BLM considered only six timber sales and thus
removed a much smaller amount of suitable owl habitat. Common factors
which led FWS to conclude that the sales would not jeopardize the
continued existence of the spotted owl included (1) little incidental take
was expected; (2) the sales were not expected to isolate provinces or
subpopulations within provinces; (3) areas of concern such as the Oregon
Coast Ranges Province'3 7 (where habitat is extremely fragmented) and
the Olympic Peninsula (which is demographically isolated) were not
significantly affected; and (4) options for long term conservation planning
would remain after the harvest of the sales.' 3 The FWS made it clear that
the existing FS and BLM SOHA-based strategies had been discredited by
the ISC Report and were inadequate because of high probabilities of local
extinctions. a9 However, the FWS stated that the ISC's plan had assumed
that the pre-318 timber sales would be harvested and that therefore
"implementation of the pre-318 sales should not impact the options for
long-term conservation" under the ISC strategy.140
The FWS expected that the pre-318 sales would result in "take" of
spotted owls through harm and harassment."' "Harm" occurs where an
action actually kills or injures wildlife and includes "significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
feeding, or sheltering."' 42 "Harassment" occurs where "an intentional or
negligent act or omission.., creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by
annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral
136. FS PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 27; BLM PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at
26.
137. The Oregon Coast Ranges Province includes, but also extends beyond, the coast ranges
area of concern, see FWS, FORMAL CONSULTATION ON 174 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT FISCAL
YEAR 1991 TIMBER SALES app. 1 (June 17, 1991) (as amended July 3, 1991) [hereinafter BLM 1991
OPINION].
138. BLM PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 2; FS PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 2.
139. See, e.g., BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at 20.
140. FS PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 17; BLM PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at
141. FS PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 23.
142. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1992).
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patterns which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or
sheltering."' 43 The FWS anticipated "take" of 190 owl pairs as a result of
"harm" or "harassment" from the FS pre-318 sales; 44 the Service
expected similar "take" of at least nine owl pairs due to the BLM pre-318
sales.145
The FWS can authorize "take" under section 7(o) if the take is
incidental to a legitimate federal action which does not violate section
7(a)(2), but the action agency must adopt "reasonable and prudent
measures" and implement "terms and conditions" imposed by the FWS in
an incidental take statement.1 46 The FWS' incidental take requirements in
the pre-318 opinions were limited to a single reasonable and prudent
measure, instructing the FS and BLM to "[p]revent disturbances to owl
pairs and their progeny during the breeding season."'' 47 This measure was
implemented through a single "term and condition" imposing an activity
restriction between March 1 and September 30. The term and condition in
the FS opinion prohibited timber harvest activities within a half mile
radius of spotted owl nest sites and activity centers unless the FS could
show that the area was unoccupied, or that seventy acres of the best
available owl habitat would remain around the site and five hundred acres
of suitable habitat would remain within a 0.7 mile radius after harvest.' 48
The term and condition in the BLM opinion was similar, but it only
prohibited the felling of trees, and it allowed harvest of an area to proceed if
BLM could show that nesting and/or fledgling activities were not
occurring.' 4 9
The pre-318 opinions are the least restrictive opinions that have been
issued by the FWS, but they provided clear warning that future opinions
might be more restrictive.' 50 In addition to encouraging additional owl
143. Id. Definitions of take by harm and harassment were eventually challenged by timber
interests, but were upheld. See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Interior
Dep't, No. 91-1468, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8045 (D. D.C. May 29, 1992).
144. FS PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 27. The FWS applied the standard for take
presented in its guidelines. See supra text accompanying note 132.
145. BLM PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 26.
146. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
147. FS PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 24; BLM PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at
23.
148. FS PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 24. This term and condition essentially required
the FS to show that "take," within the definition of the FWS guidelines, would not occur. See supra text
accompanying note 132.
149. BLM PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 23. This term was slightly less restrictive than
the condition imposed on FS sales, but it would essentially accomplish the same purpose.
150. See, e.g., FS PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 27-28 (calling for implementation of a
long term conservation strategy, and warning that continuation of the type of planning used in the Pre-
318 sales might lead to future findings of jeopardy).
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research and monitoring, the "conservation recommendations" 151 in both
opinions urged the harvest management agencies to adopt the ISC
conservation strategy, to minimize impacts of harvest, and to create or
restore habitat through implementation and testing of new timber harvest
prescriptions. 152 These prescriptions include leaving snags and woody
material, eliminating burning of post harvest fuels where possible, treat-
ment of young stands to facilitate rapid growth and production of multi-
storied stands, creation of decadent tree components through topping or
girdling large trees, selective harvest, and leaving trees after harvest to
serve as a future upper canopy layer.153 FWS also suggested that the
agencies make adjustments in their timber bases and allowable sale
quantities and further, either relocate or eliminate sales that fall within the
guidelines' definition of "take,"' 154 within HCAs, near nest sites, and in
some areas of concern. 55 In addition, the FWS suggested that the BLM
add language in its sale contracts to allow greater agency discretion to
impose contract modifications to protect listed species.'5 6 The FWS
concluded both pre-318 opinions with warnings that if timber sale planning
continued to result in "spatially random reduction of habitat," it would
"increase the likelihood of localized extirpations," and might "lead to a
finding of jeopardy" on future federal actions.' 57
151. "Conservation recommendations" are "suggestions of the Service regarding discretionary
measures to minimize or avoid adverse effects.., or regarding the development of information." 50
C.F.R. § 402.02 (1992). Conservation recommendations are "advisory and are not intended to carry
any binding legal force." Id. § 402.14(j). Thus, conservation recommendations are often ignored by
the action agencies, even when they would be easily achievable. Conservation recommendations are not
mentioned in the statute, and the idea of completely discretionary recommendations conflicts with the
language of section 7(a)(1) which requires federal agencies, through consultation, to use their
authority to carry out programs for the conservation of listed species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1)
(1988). However the current regulations do not include provisions for the Services to impose binding
conditions unless "take" is involved, in which case the Services can require "reasonable and prudent
measures," or "jeopardy" is found, in which case the Services can present "reasonable and prudent
alternatives." See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)-j) (1992).
152. FS PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 25-26; BLM PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135,
at 24-25.
153. FS PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 25-26; BLM PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135,
at 24-25.
154. See supra text accompanying note 132.
155. FS PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 25-26; BLM PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135,
at 24-25.
156. BLM PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 24. The BLM interpreted its existing contracts
as preventing the BLM from renegotiating or interfering with harvest after a sale had been awarded
unless listed species were physically located within the sale boundaries. See infra note 162 and
accompanying text.
157. FS PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 27; BLM PRE-318 OPINION, supra note 135, at
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2. The Section 318 Opinions
The FWS issued the opinion on FS Section 318 sales (318 sales) on
July 23, 1990 at the same time as it issued the opinion on FS pre-318 sales.
The FWS issued the opinion on BLM 318 sales on November 23, less than
two months after issuing its opinion on BLM pre-318 sales. As with the pre-
318 sales, the ISC strategy assumed that the 318 sales would be harvested,
and that long-term conservation would nevertheless still be possible.
However, despite their close relationship in time and similar position under
the ISC strategy, the results of consultation on the 318 sales were
somewhat different. Differences in treatment resulted primarily from the
fact that the FS and the BLM had not yet awarded contracts for harvest on
some of the 318 sales, while the pre-318 sales had been awarded, although
not yet harvested. The FWS considered unawarded sales to be subject to
greater action agency discretion and thus felt free to impose more stringent
conditions on these sales than it had on the awarded pre-318 sales.
Although the FWS separated the sales into only two categories,
awarded and unawarded, there was also another important group of sales:
sales which the action agencies did not submit for consultation. The FS
utilized a "may affect" standard in accordance with FWS guidelines,'58
and initiated consultation whenever a sale involved harvest of suitable owl
habitat or harvest within one-half mile of an owl pair's nest site or activity
center.159 This resulted in FS consultation on 185 awarded timber sales and
524 unawarded sales, representing slightly over 63 percent of its 1,123
unharvested sales. 60 The BLM acknowledged that contemplated sales
within owl habitat or within one-half mile of a nest site were likely to
adversely affect the spotted owl; nevertheless, it did not initiate consulta-
tion for many of these sales.' 6' The BLM claimed that under its timber sale
contracts, the agency lacked discretion to interfere with awarded sales
unless a listed species is known to occur in the contract area; furthermore,
the BLM argued that "presence" had to be established through location of
a nest site or pair activity center within the boundaries of the harvest
area.'62 This contract interpretation allowed the BLM to restrict consulta-
tion to less than 35 percent of its 453 sales.' 63 BLM consulted on only 30 of
302 awarded sales, but consultation was required for 127 of 151 sales
158. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
159. FS 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 3.
160. Id.
161. BLM 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 3-4.
162. BLM 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 3-4. The regulations limit the application of section
7 to actions "in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control." 50 C.F.R. § 402.03
(1992).
163. BLM 318 OPINIo N, supra note 135, at 3.
1993]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
which were not awarded."" FWS argued that "presence" would be likely
whenever a contract area fell within the home range of spotted owl pairs, 6 5
but because the ultimate responsibility to comply with the mandate of
section 7(a)(2) is on the federal action agency, the Service did not have
authority to require consultation.
1 66
The FWS determined that the 318 sales would not jeopardize the
continued existence of the spotted owl. The FWS stated that options for
long-term conservation planning would remain after the 318 sales, and that
the sales would not lead to the isolation of provinces and subpopulations. 167
In addition, in the opinion on the FS sales, FWS stated that areas of
concern would not be significantly impacted. 68 In the opinion on the BLM
sales, FWS stated that only a small amount of take would result from
harvest of the 318 sales, 6 9 however the expected take of approximately 150
owl pairs appears small only when compared to the take of 353 owl pairs by
the FS 318 sales.' 70
The FWS did not consider requiring relocation or elimination of
awarded timber sales to be within its authority,' 7' but it did consider
relocation or elimination of unawarded sales to be "minor changes" within
its authority.17  Because of this perceived difference in authority, awarded
timber sales were allowed to proceed merely with nesting season restric-
tions like those imposed on pre-318 sales, regardless of the location of the
sale. However, FWS attempted to use the "reasonable and prudent
164. Id.
165. Id. at 4.
166. The mandate of section 7(a)(2) is on "[e]ach federal agency," 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2)
(1988), and thus the biological opinion is advisory; once the opinion has been issued the regulations
leave the final decision on "whether and in what manner to proceed with the action," to the action
agency. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.15(a) (1992). The courts do not even consider a "nojeopardy" biological
opinion to conclusively establish compliance with the substantive requirements of section 7. See
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th
Cir. 1990) (stating that a "federal agency cannot abrogate its responsibility to ensure that its actions
will not jeopardize a listed species," and stating that reliance on a FWS opinion must not be arbitrary or
capricious). The regulations allow the Services to request consultation, see 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a)
(1992), but they make no provision for sanctions for failure to consult upon request.
167. FS 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 2; BLM 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 2.
168. FS 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 2.
169. BLM 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 2.
170. The total take from the BLM 318 sales was estimated at between 149 pairs and 167 pairs,
but the FWS minimized the importance of the take because 148 pairs were considered to have already
been reproductively impaired by reduction of suitable habitat to less than 40 percent within their home
ranges. Id. at 18, 23. The FWS estimated that the FS 318 sales affected 667 spotted owl pairs and
resulted in take of 353 pairs. FS 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 25.
171. See, e.g., BLM 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 19. FWS felt that a change outside the
scope of existing contract language would not be "reasonable and prudent" and would be more than a
"minor modification." Id.
172. See, e.g., id. at 19-20. See also supra note 21 (explaining the "minor change rule" which
limits the authority of the Services to require modification of an action to reduce harm to listed species).
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measures" to extend substantial protection to owls affected by unawarded
sales involving "take" in proposed HCAs and areas of concern. These sales
were placed under a second FWS "reasonable and prudent measure": to
"[m]aintain essential habitat within close proximity of spotted owl nest
sites or activity centers and maintain adequate breeding, foraging, and
sheltering habitat within the home range of owls. .... ,,173 The FWS
implemented this measure through stringent "terms and conditions"
calling for the elimination or relocation of sales: (1) within 0.5 miles of a
nest site or owl activity center, unless the best 70 acres of contiguous core
habitat would remain after harvest, and, in addition, 500 acres of suitable
habitat would still remain within 0.7 miles; and (2) within areas of concern
where the sale would reduce the suitable habitat within the median home
range of an owl pair to an amount less than forty percent, unless the area
already contained less than twenty percent suitable habitat. 174 FWS
believed that these terms and conditions fell within the "minor change"
limitation imposed by the regulations,'75 because the conditions directly
affected less than three percent of the total FS 318 sale volume, 176 and less
than seven percent of BLM 318 sale volume. 7 7 Further FWS stated that
the effects of the conditions could be reduced through relocation of sales.' 78
The discretionary "conservation recommendations"' 79 suggested by
the FWS in the section 318 opinions stressed the importance of rapid
adoption of the ISC conservation strategy by federal land management
agencies. The recommendations stated that increased protection of all
remaining pairs would be necessary if the ISC was not adopted quickly. 80
The opinions also repeated most of the pre-318 recommendations, includ-
ing recommending that timber sale units in areas of concern be eliminated
or relocated unless the land management agencies adopted the 50-11-40
rule, and suggesting that the timber base be adjusted and allowable sale
quantities reduced. 8'
173. FS 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 21; BLM 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 19.
174. FS 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 21. Areas of concern to which the conditions applied
included: "the Olympic Peninsula and Oregon Coast Ranges Provinces, the Southern Deschutes and
Northern Washington Cascades Areas of Concern; and the Columbia River, 1-90, 1-5, and Santiam
Pass corridors." Id. See also BLM 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 19-20.
175. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(2) (1992). See also supra note 21.
176. FS 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 22.
177. BLM 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 20. BLM claimed that 22 percent of its sale volume
was affected, but despite objecting that FWS had violated the "minor change rule," see supra note 21,
BLM requested issuance of a final biological opinion including the condition because it felt that the
impacts of holding up the other sales would be unacceptable. Memorandum from Dean Bibles, State
Director, BLM, to Marvin Plenert, Regional Director, FWS I (Nov. 19, 1990).
178. FS 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 22.
179. "Conservation recommendations" are explained supra at note 151.
180. FS 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 22; BLM 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 21.
181. FS 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 23-24; BLM 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 21-23.
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3. Agency Response to Early Opinions
Both the FS and the BLM attempted to avert ESA conflicts by
adopting interim timber management standards which would provide
greater protection for the spotted owl than their past management
guidelines. 18 2 The BLM also attempted to focus consultation on individual
sales instead of sale programs. 183 This was a transparent attempt to reduce
the scope of consultation in order to invoke the "minor change rule"'' to
prevent the FWS from imposing "reasonable and prudent measures," like
those imposed on the 318 sales which required the elimination or relocation
of sales.' 85
On October 3, 1990 the FS published a notice vacating its existing
plans for management of spotted owl habitat and announced that, as an
interim measure, it would "conduct timber management activities in a
manner not inconsistent with the ISC recommendations."'u8 The BLM
developed its own owl plan, commonly known as the "Jamison Strategy,"
and on September 24, 1990, published management guidelines for fiscal
years 1991 and 1992 pursuant to this strategy. 181 The Jamison Strategy
protected ISC HCAs and 110 SOHAs, but it fell short of the ISC plan by
protecting HCAs from "regular green timber sales" but not from salvage
sales or commercial thinning.' 88 Further, the Jamison Strategy did not
fully implement the 50-11-40 rule, instead it encouraged management of
dispersal habitat to the 50-11-40 rule only "where possible."' 89
Courts eventually enjoined the interim management guidelines of
both the FS and the BLM for violations of the National Environmental
182. See Dep't of Agriculture, Vacation of Northern Spotted Owl Guidance, 55 Fed. Reg.
40,412 (1990) (Notice) [hereinafter FS Interim Measure]; BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE CONSERVATION OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL FY 1991
THROUGH FY 1992 (Sept. 24, 1990) [hereinafter BLM GUIDELINES].
183. See 1991 BLM OPINION, supra note 137, at 40.
184. For an explanation of the "minor change rule" see supra note 21.
185. If the FWS required the elimination of 70 acres of owl habitat from a sale it would
undoubtedly be a minor change if the "action" were considered to be the BLM's entire timber sale
program, but if the "action" were considered in terms of a single sale, 70 acres could be the majority of
the sale.
186. FS Interim Measure, supra note 182, at 40,412. See also FWS, FORMAL SECTION 7
CONSULTATION ON THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE REGION 6 FISCAL YEAR 1991 TIMBER SALE PROGRAM
(SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING 171 TIMBER SALES) 6 (Apr. 10, 1991) [hereinafter FS 1991 BATCH I
OPINION].
187. BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 182.
188. "Regular green sales" involve high volume harvest prescriptions such as clearcutting; a
prohibition on green sales does not prevent salvage sales, commercial thinning, or other lower volume
harvest prescriptions. See BLM 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 12.
189. BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at 18. See also BLM, NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL:
THE JAMISON PLAN DETAILED MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, reprinted in BLM GUIDELINES, supra note
182, at app. A.
230 [Vol. 14
CONSULTATION REQUIREMENTS
Policy Act (NEPA), 190  the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA),' 9 ' and the ESA, 92 but not before being evaluated in several
FWS opinions on timber harvest. The FWS recognized the FS adoption of
the ISC on an interim basis as a positive step, and in April of 1991, based a
no jeopardy decision largely upon the fact that the timber sale program was
consistent with the ISC strategy and involved less timber harvest than the
estimated sustainable annual maximum under the ISC strategy. 9 ' How-
ever, at the time, FWS also stated that management consistent with the
ISC strategy was not enough to assure ESA compliance, because the ISC
strategy only attempts to ensure the survival of the spotted owl for 100
years while the ESA requires the survival and recovery of the species. 94
The FWS also observed that proceeding under the ISC strategy would
eliminate future management options which should be preserved because
assumptions behind the ISC strategy were untested. 9 Despite the fact
that the FS received a "no jeopardy" opinion for all its sales, 57 of the sales
were found to involve incidental take and were thus subjected to terms and
conditions which, in addition to imposing nesting season restrictions, also
required the deferral of harvest and sales around HCAs and in the Oregon
Coast Ranges Province until additional owl surveys had been conducted
and additional owls protected. 9 6 BLM failed to consult with FWS on the
Jamison Strategy. 197 In its biological opinions on timber sales, FWS did
not give much attention to the Jamison Strategy, but simply warned that
the plan was inadequate, and that BLM's failure to comply threatened the
success of the ISC strategy. 98
C. The BLM Jeopardy Opinions
1. The Jeopardy Determinations
The BLM's failure to adopt the ISC strategy led the FWS to make a
"jeopardy" determination on 52 of the BLM's proposed 174 fiscal year
190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988).
191. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1988).
192. Id. §§ 1531-1544. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F.Supp 1081 (W.D.
Wash. 1991) affld 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991); Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, No. 91-
6123-JO, 1991 WL 354,885 (D. Or. Sept. II, 1991) aff'd in part, 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992).
193. FS 1991 BATCH I OPINION, supra note 186, at 2.
194. Id. at 13.
195. Id. at 14-15.
196. Id. at 23-25.
197. Lane County Audubon Soc'yv. Jamison, No.91-6123-JO, 1991 WL354,885 (D.Or.Sept.
II, 1991) aFd in part, 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992).
198. See. e.g., BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at 18.
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1991 sales.199 However, FWS issued jeopardy opinions only for sales within
the Oregon Coast Ranges, where it considered the amount of owl habitat to
be dangerously low, and within the Rogue-Umpqua and Willamette/
North Umpqua areas of concern, which FWS deemed to provide vital
linkage between the Coast Ranges and Cascades Provinces.2 00 Even within
these areas of concern, the FWS did not find jeopardy for every violation of
the 50-11-40 rule. Outside these areas of concern, the FWS found no
jeopardy despite the BLM's widespread violation of the 50-11-40 rule.2 01
Within the coast ranges, FWS made "jeopardy" determinations for
all sales which involved "take" of known owl singles or pairs,20 2 and for
most sales which reduced dispersal habitat in violation of the 50-11-40
rule.203 These determinations did not coincide with the requirements of the
ISC strategy which called for the management of the entire forest matrix
outside of HCAs according to 50-11-40 rule,204 and also called for category
3 HCAs around owl pairs in the Oregon Coast Ranges area of concern. 05
In addition, the ISC strategy prescribed up to seven 80-acre "retention
areas" (Category 4 HCAs) per township around known owl pairs.206 While
the ISC strategy called for HCAs only around pairs, not singles, that
strategy would have provided considerably more protection for these pairs
than that offered by the FWS take prohibition because a category 3 HCA
would require protection of owls mean range, a 1.5 mile radius in the coast
ranges."7 The FWS gave jeopardy opinions to most of the sales violating
the 50-11-40 rule in the coast ranges area of concern, but during
consultation it determined that six sales within this area were unimportant
for maintaining dispersal due to factors such as the general area exceeding
50-11-40 condition, isolation from other habitat, questionable suitability
as dispersal habitat, and low concentrations of federal ownership in the
area.20 8 Despite these departures from the ISC strategy, the FWS
199. Id. at 2.
200. Id. at 2-3, 22.
201. See id. at 3, 40. See also id. at app. I (table lists proposed sales and their effects; when the
"jeopardy" sales are eliminated 45 sales which violate the 50-11-40 rule remain).
202. See id. at 2-4, app. 1.
203. Id.
204. ISC REPORT, supra note 28, at 29.
205. Id. at 323.
206. ISC REPORT, supra note 28, at 324, 326.
207. See id. at 324. Compare BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at 22-23 (FWS take
definition) and ISC REPORT, supra note 28, at 323-324 (HCA guidelines). While a Category 3 HCA
would protect a 1.5 mile radius around the owls' nest or activity center, id. at 324, the FWS "take"
definition only protects a 70 acre core, requires the maintenance of 500 acres of suitable habitat within
a 0.7 mile radius, and requires the maintenance of 40 percent suitable habitat within the owls' mean
home range. BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at 22-23.
208. BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at 3,9. The FWS used low concentrations of federal
ownership or isolation from other federal land as one of the justifications for six of the seven exceptions,
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determined that forty of the sixty-one proposed sales within the coast range
area of concern were likely to create jeopardy for the spotted owl. 20 9
Outside the coast range area of concern, the FWS extended even less
protection to the owl. Except in areas of concern which were designated for
linkage between physiographic provinces, the FWS did not deem violation
of the 50-11-40 rule to create jeopardy. Even in linkage areas, FWS did not
deem spotted owl "take" to create jeopardy. 210 The FWS determined that
only ten sales outside the coast ranges would result in jeopardy. All of these
were within the Rouge-Umpqua and South Willamette/North Umpqua
areas of concern.21' In these areas, dispersal was already impaired by the
fact that 37 percent of the quarter townships with BLM ownership were
below 50-11-40 condition. 12 The FWS determined that no sales outside
these areas of concern would produce jeopardy, despite widespread
"takes" and violation of the 50-11-40 rule.213
2. Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives
If consultation results in a "jeopardy" opinion, the biological opinion
produced by the Services must include a statement of any "reasonable and
prudent alternatives" which would avoid violation of section 7(a)(2).11
These "reasonable and prudent alternatives" must be "economically and
technologically feasible," consistent with the purpose of the action, and
within the authority and jurisdiction of the action agency.21 5 In the case of
the BLM 1991 jeopardy opinions, the FWS issued reasonable and prudent
alternatives which required deferring sales until they could be determined
to be consistent with a long-term conservation strategy or recovery plan.216
In the coast ranges area of concern, the FWS "reasonable and prudent
alternative" required deferral of timber sales, or portions of timber sales,
which either fell within the home range of an owl or involved violation of the
but did not explain the relevance of this factor. Low federal ownership could be a logical factor because
most private land is managed for timber harvest and generally does not contain suitable habitat;
however, in three of the six low federal ownership sales, FWS also relied on the fact that the general
area was in greater than 50-11-40 condition. See id.
209. Compare id. tbl. 1, at 4 and app. 1.
210. Id. at 2, 5, app. 1. There were twelve "no jeopardy" sales in the Rouge-Umpqua and South
Willamette/North Umpqua areas of concern, and five of these involved "take." See id.
211. Id. at 2.
212. Id. at 22.
213. Compare id. tbl. 3, at 6-8 and app. 1 (Altogether, over one third of the 122 "no jeopardy"
sales were expected to result in violation of the 50-11-40 rule, over one forth involved take, and
approximately ten percent involved both take and violation of the 50-11-40 rule).
214. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3) (1992).
215. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1992).
216. BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at 33.
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50-11-40 rule.2 17 For the "jeopardy" sales outside the coast ranges area of
concern, the alternative required deferral only for the sales or portions of
sales that violated the 50-11-40 rule.218 The FWS considered these
alternatives to be within the BLM's authority because the BLM had
previously deferred sales subjected to terms and conditions in "no
jeopardy" opinions.219 The FWS claimed that these alternatives were
consistent with the intended purpose of the action and were economically
and technologically feasible because they allowed the sales to be offered in
the future, involved no technological changes in the action, and required no
resource loss since the value of the harvestable timber was likely to
increase, "resulting in higher economic return in future years."220
The "reasonable and prudent alternatives" to the "jeopardy" sales
promised to delay the sales for some time if the BLM decided to adopt
them. The FWS required the sales to be consistent with a "long-term
conservation strategy or recovery plan" before being implemented, but the
sales were inconsistent with the ISC strategy which the FWS had
recognized as "the only scientifically credible conservation strategy
existing for the spotted owl." 22' As a result of the FWS "jeopardy"
determinations, the BLM sought an exemption through the Endangered
Species Committee for forty-four of the fifty-two sales.2"2 The Committee
granted BLM exemptions for thirteen sales. But even this partial victory
was hollow for BLM because the exemptions were conditioned on BLM
adoption of FWS's final recovery plan for the owl,22 3 use of the recovery
plan as the basis for its annual and decadal plans, and suspension of sales
until the decadal plan has been approved through programmatic consulta-
tion with FWS.2 2 4 Thus, if BLM conducted timber sales on the thirteen
exemptions the agency would have to conform its entire timber program to
a FWS recovery plan, or if the recovery plan was unacceptable to the BLM,
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 34. The BLM had sought to avoid "terms and conditions" imposed on a number of
sales through programmatic consultation on 318 sales by resubmitting them for consultation on an
individual basis, apparently hoping that application of the "minor change" rule, see supra note 21, to
individual actions would result in less stringent restrictions. See FWS, FORMAL SECTION 7
CONSULTATION ON 8 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT FISCAL YEAR 1990 TIMBER SALES 4 (Sept. 19,
1991); Memorandum from Dean Bibles, State Director, BLM, to Marvin Plenert, Regional Director,
FWS 1 (Nov. 19, 1990) (requesting final biological opinion on section 318 sales but objecting to drop
recommendations as beyond the "minor change" rule); see also supra note 185 and accompanying text.
220. BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at 34.
221. Id. at 38.
222. See Endangered Species Committee, Notice of Decision, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,405 (1992)
[hereinafter BLM Exemption].
223. Implementation of recovery plans is required under section 4(f) unless the Services
determine that such a plan will not benefit the species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1988).
224. BLM Exemption, supra note 222, at 23,408.
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to a future Endangered Species Committee determination.
3. Incidental Take Statements
FWS allowed sales to proceed despite "take" of owls, but used
"reasonable and prudent measures" to extend additional protection to owls
affected by sales involving "take." FWS prepared incidental take state-
ments for thirty-seven "no jeopardy" sales involving a total "take" of up to
sixty-two owl pairs or resident singles,22 5 and also for thirty-one of the fifty-
two "jeopardy" sales where the FWS expected eventual harvest under the
"reasonable and prudent alternatives" to result in a total "take" of thirty-
nine owl pairs or resident singles. 26 FWS also required reinitiation of
consultation if other owls were discovered whose provincial home ranges
would be affected.2 7 The "reasonable and prudent measures" included
protection of (1) owl pairs and progeny during the nesting season; (2) pairs
and resident singles around HCAs with less than 75 percent of target
occupancy; and, (3) pairs and resident singles in the coast ranges.228 The
terms and conditions imposed presented both substantive and procedural
barriers to harvest, promising temporary delay on many sales and
indefinite delay of "take" in some areas, making some of the "take"
allowances essentially illusional.
The terms and conditions preventing nesting season disturbances
protected a minimum radius of 0.25 miles around nest sites or activity
centers from potential disturbances, with additional protection dependent
on the discretion of BLM biologists.229 In addition, the FWS required
surveys of harvest sites before harvest and, if previously located owls could
not be found, surveys of all areas within 0.25 miles of the harvest unit.
However, since the purpose of the restriction was to encourage reproduc-
tive success and juvenile survival, the BLM was allowed to drop nesting
season restrictions if nesting or reproductive success surveys revealed "that
spotted owls are non-nesting or that no young were produced during the
year of harvest. '230
Within the Oregon Coast Ranges Province, the terms and conditions
protecting all pairs and resident singles required the deferral of all timber
sales until after the BLM had conducted surveys according to FWS
guidelines.231 In addition, the FWS required three survey visits during the
225. BLM 1991 OPINIoN, supra note 137, at 40.
226. Id. at 34.
227. Id. at 31, 34.
228. Id. at 35.
229. Id. at 31-32.
230. Id. at 31-32.
231. Id. at 32. The FWS allowed the BLM to count pre-1991 surveys which did not conform to
1991 FWS guidelines. Id. Surveying under FWS guidelines is a complicated process which requires a
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year of harvest, with all spotted owl habitat within 1.5 miles of the harvest
activity included in the surveys.2"2 The FWS required reinitiation of
consultation whenever new pairs or resident singles which would be
"taken" by the timber sales were located. 33
Outside the Oregon Coast Ranges Province, the terms and conditions
required the deferral of timber sales within a radius of up to six miles
around a category 1 HCA with an occupancy of less than fifteen pairs and
singles, or a category 2 HCA with less than 75 percent of target
occupancy. 23 4 If the HCA target occupancy could not be confirmed
through surveys, the BLM was to protect additional owls outside the HCA
to make up the difference between target and actual occupancy of the
HCA. Those owls with the highest quality habitat were to be prioritized for
protection..23  However, where an HCA was managed by more than one




FWS also included "conservation recommendations 2 3 7 in its biologi-
cal opinion on the BLM sales. For the most part, the recommendations
echoed previous recommendations by calling for adoption of the ISC
strategy, changes in harvest prescriptions, and a reduction in allowable sale
quantities. 3 s However, FWS also added several new recommendations,
encouraging BLM to make more drastic changes, such as exceeding the 50-
11-40 rule on BLM land to compensate for unsuitable conditions on
adjacent land and protecting large contiguous blocks of habitat outside of
HCAs.239
minimum of six visits to the area between March 15 and August 31 over a two-year period. See FWS,
GUIDELINES FOR SURVEYING PROPOSED MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES THAT MAY IMPACT NORTHERN
SPOTTED OWLS, (Mar. 7, 1991), reprinted in BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at attachment I.
232. BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at 32.
233. Id. Since jeopardy opinions were issued on all sales which involved "take" in the coast
ranges (although there were no proposed sales within the coast range but outside the coast range area of
concern which involved "take"), reinitiation of consultation because of a "take" could result in further
jeopardy opinions in these areas.
234. Id. The actual radius required was the lesser of six miles or half the distance to the nearest
HCA (owls are associated with the HCA to which they are nearest). Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. Thus two additional owls would need to be protected from "take" if there were an HCA
managed 50 percent by the FS and 50 percent by the BLM with a target occupancy of 20 and an actual
occupancy of thirteen. However, the BLM would only have to protect one owl and then could proceed
with harvest even if the FS had not yet protected an additional owl.
237. See supra note 151.




D. Recent Owl Opinions
Following the issuance of the BLM jeopardy opinions, the FWS
issued a number of "nojeopardy" decisions to both the BLM and the FS.240
The types of requirements and the recommendations made in these
opinions did not appear to vary substantially from the standards outlined in
the BLM jeopardy opinions.24 The FWS has not issued any further
"jeopardy" opinions, despite the fact that the BLM has continued to
violate the 50-11-40 rule.242
The FWS also consulted on the FS adoption of the ISC strategy as its
official management policy.24 Although that consultation resulted in a "no
jeopardy" opinion, the FWS did not issue a blanket "incidental take
statement." Thus, the adoption of the strategy did not eliminate the
requirement for future consultations on individual actions which involve
potential owl "take."244 Despite the "no jeopardy" opinion, the FS has been
enjoined by the courts from conducting sales under the ISC strategy
because the FS violated NEPA24 5 by failing to consider significant new
evidence in its EIS.246
E. Implications of the Owl Opinions
The biological opinions which have been issued by the FWS on the
spotted owl make it clear that consultation is having significant effects on
the action agencies and is resulting in some protection for the spotted owl.
The FWS has used "take" restrictions to reduce threats to reproductive
success and to protect owls in and around HCAs, and in areas of concern.
By using an appropriate "take" restriction such as those protecting owls
240. See, e.g., FWS, BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS ON 82 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT FISCAL
YEAR 1992 TIMBER SALES, (Feb. 4, 1992, amended Mar. 11, 1992)[hereinafter BLM 82 FY 1992
SALES OPINION]; U.S. FWS, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON FOREST SERVICE THIRD BATCH OF TIMBER
SALES (Mar. 3, 1992) [hereinafter FS 1991 THIRD BATCH OPINION].
241. However, because the FS adopted the ISC Strategy, the effect was that the FS was held to a
higher standard than the BLM and was required to manage to the 50-1 1-40 rule as well as being subject
to the same types of reasonable and prudent measures where "take" was involved. See, e.g., FS 1991
THIRD BATCH OPINION, supra note 240, at 14, 18.
242. See, e.g., BLM 82 FY 1992 SALES OPINION, supra note 240, at 25-31 (27 of 82 sales in
violation of the 50-11-40 rule).
243. U.S. FWS, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE IN THE FOREST
SERVICE'S DEIS ON MANAGEMENT FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL (Dec. 18, 1991) [hereinafter
FS DEIS OPINION], reprinted in FS FEIS, supra note 59, at app. M.
244. See id. at 7-8.
245. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988).
246. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F.Supp. 1473, 1479-82 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
One of the factors undermining FS adoption of the ISC strategy was the exemption granted to the
BLM, since both the FS FEIS and the FWS "no jeopardy" opinion stated that the strategy would need
reconsideration if exemptions were granted. Id. at 1480; FS DEIS OPINION, supra note 243, at 6.
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around HCAs which are below 75 percent of target occupancy,247 FWS
protects additional owls and habitat and increases the likelihood of
eventual success of conservation efforts without making a politically
perilous "jeopardy" decision. Further, the FWS has issued "jeopardy"
opinions when agency actions were proposed in some areas which the FWS
considered critical. The FWS has also issued "conservation recommenda-
tions" which, although purely discretionary, could result in improved
present and future conditions if followed by the action agencies. However,
just as clearly, the FWS has allowed actions to proceed despite harm to the
owl; often these actions violate FWS's own standards. 48 Most striking is
the fact that FWS has continually allowed the BLM to violate the ISC's
50-11-40 rule even after (1) accepting the ISC strategy as a conservation
goal against which future actions need to be measured;249 (2) acknowledg-
ing that the ISC goal of survival for 100 years might be inadequate to meet
the requirements of the ESA;2 50 and (3) noting that management of BLM
lands was a critical part of the ISC strategy.25'
A "jeopardy" determination allows the FWS to exercise a great deal
of power, but the FWS appears reluctant to exercise this power. Despite
continually repeating the importance of action agency adoption of the ISC
strategy, the FWS has not required agency actions to conform to the ISC
strategy, nor has it required the agencies to prove that the their actions are
consistent with any management strategy providing for the long-term
survival of the owl. Although the Services may lack the authority to require
action agencies to consult on existing management strategies, 52 FWS
would have the authority to determine that actions inconsistent with the
ISC strategy jeopardize the owl. 253 Any new management strategies
designed to a avoid jeopardy decisions would be subject to consultation
under section 7.254 Thus, the FWS could utilize "jeopardy" determinations
247. See, e.g., supra note 242 and accompanying text.
248. See PROCEDURES FOR COMPLIANCE, supra note 124, at 5.
249. PROCEDURES FOR COMPLIANCE supra note 124, at 5.
250. See, e.g., FS 1991 BATCH 1 OPINION, supra note 186, at 13.
251. BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at 19.
252. Compliance with the terms of section 7 is the responsibility of the action agency, and
although the regulations allow the services to request consultation for agency actions that may affect
listed species, no provision is made for action agency refusal to consult. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a)
(1992). Further, the Services do not have express authority to define the scope of an action, and where
an "agency action" of plan adoption has been completed, an agency may be able to proceed with
consultation limited to individual actions under the plan while evading consultation on the underlying
management strategy.
253. Under the statute, the burden is on the action agencies to "insure" that their actions will not
jeopardize a listed species, using the best scientific data available, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988),and
FWS has recognized the ISC strategy as the only existing "scientifically credible conservation
strategy" for the owl. See BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note. 137, at 38.
254. See, e.g., FS DEIS OPINION, supra note 243 (consultation on FS adoption of ISC strategy).
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to effectively force the action agencies to choose between abandoning
potential actions or adopting new management strategies consistent with
long-term conservation, 55 but FWS appears reluctant to exercise its
discretion in this manner, preferring instead to rely on a patchwork of
incidental take restrictions for species protection.
2 6
Although Service discretion is greatest where a "jeopardy" determi-
nation is reached, the power of the FWS to affect the actions of harvest
management agencies does not always depend on such a determination.
Where "incidental take" is involved, the FWS can impose restrictions to
minimize the impact of the take. 57 In order to avoid issuing jeopardy
opinions, the FWS appears to have relied on this authority, issuing
restrictive incidental take conditions which afford significant protection to
the spotted owl. These conditions are often restrictive enough to delay or
even prevent harvest despite a "no jeopardy" opinion. By using such
conditions, FWS avoids making politically onerous "jeopardy" decisions
while still providing some protection for the owl, but as a result, protection
is erratic and inefficient and harvest activities are subject to constant
uncertainty. Some of the conditions used by FWS may be in violation of the
"minor change" rule, 58 particularly where they require long-term defer-
ral, elimination, or relocation of sales.2 59 However, the action agencies
appear to prefer these restrictive conditions and the delay and uncertainty
that accompanies them to a "jeopardy" opinion, and thus are willing to
accept extremely restrictive conditions.260
See also Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 293 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
Jamison Strategy was "agency action" requiring consultation).
255. Although a FWS "jeopardy" determination would not be binding on the action agency, see
supra note 166, the courts ordinarily give great weight to biological opinions of the Services, and
"agencies proceeding with an action in the face of an adverse biological opinion will be doing so at their
peril." H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 8, at 12.
256. FWS reluctance to dictate agency policy is not unique to the case of the owl. The comments
accompanying the 1986 amendments to the section 7 regulations stated, "[i]n no way does the Service
intend to use the consultation procedures of section 7 to establish substantive policy for Federal
agencies." See Interagency Cooperation Final Rule, supra note 12, at 19,928.
257. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (1992).
258. See supra note 21.
259. See, e.g., FS 318 OPINION, supra note 135, at 21; BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at
35-36. Requirements of long-term deferral, elimination, or relocation seem to involve basic changes in
design, location, scope, and timing, in direct contradiction of the limitations imposed by the
regulations. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (1992).
260. See, e.g., Memorandum from Dean Bibles, State Director, BLM to Marvin Plenert
Regional Director, FWS 1 (Nov. 19, 1990) (requesting issuance of final biological opinion after review
of draft opinion; despite contention that conditions imposed in it would reduce unawarded "may affect"
timber sales by 22 percent). Violations of the "minor change rule" will probably go unchallenged if the
action agencies do not challenge them because a biological opinion is considered advisory. See supra
note 166. Thus, third party challenges would be limited to whether the action agencies' acceptance was
arbitrary and capricious. See also supra note 21.
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IV. CONSULTATION AND THE SNAKE RIVER SALMON
The NMFS has conducted a number of formal and informal consulta-
tions2 6' concerning the effects of federal activities on the listed Snake River
salmon. These consultations cover a broad range of activities, including
activities attempting species and migration enhancement,262 continuation
of activities which have contributed to the current status of the salmon,263
and activities designed to reduce the economic and recreational side effects
of salmon conservation measures.2 64 This section analyzes the NMFS
consultation framework and biological opinions issued on two important
activities-operation of the FCRPS, and harvest of salmon.
A. NMFS Objectives for 1992 Consultations
Most of the 1992 salmon consultations were conducted under extreme
time pressures due to the seasonal and ongoing nature of the federal actions
involved and the fact that the first salmon listing did not occur until
November 20, 1991.265 NMFS had only the ESA's prohibition on actions
"likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a species" to guide it in
carrying out its consultations because no critical habitat had yet been
designated or proposed,2 66 and a recovery plan had not yet been devel-
261. See supra note 14 (explaining informal consultation).
262. See, e.g., NMFS, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON IDAHO DEP'T OF FISH AND GAME'S 1992
JUVENILE AND ADULT TRAPPING PROGRAM (Apr. 8, 1992).
263. See, e.g., FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65.
264. See, e.g., Letter from Merritt E. Tuttle, Division Chief, NMFS, to Robert E. Willis, COE
Portland District (Dec. 6, 1991) (concurrence to COE biological assessment on Columbia River
emergency dredging sites).
265. These time pressures were unnecessary; the Snake River Sockeye listing was proposed on
April 5, 1991, and the chinook listing was proposed on June 27, 199 1. See Sockeye Listing, supra note
25, at 58,619; Chinook Listing, supra note 26, at 14,654. Section 7(a)(4) requires federal action
agencies to confer with the Services on actions which are likely to jeopardize any species proposed for
listing. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) (1988). Recommendations during a conference are strictly
advisory, and formal consultation is still required if the species is listed before the action is complete.
However, the action agency can request that a conference be conducted according to the procedures for
formal consultation, and if this is done, the result is a "conference opinion" which can be adopted as a
biological opinion when the species is listed if no significant new information has been developed. See 50
C.F.R. § 402.10(c)-(d) (1992). Section 4(b)(7) does provide for emergency listing of species in some
circumstances, see 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7) (1988), and if this occurred, a Service argument that time
constraints prevented full consultation might be legitimate.
266. Section 4 of the ESA requires, "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable," the
designation of critical habitat concurrently with listing. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (1988). However, the
absence of critical habitat designation has little substantive effect since under the current regulations,
the ESA's prohibition on "adverse modification" applies only if an action "appreciably diminishes the
value of critical habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02
(1992). Thus, adverse modification effectively requires a finding of jeopardy. See supra note 9. The
importance of the restriction on adverse modification is further reduced by the fact that critical habitat
has not been designated for most listed species despite the fact that courts have held that critical habitat
designation should occur concurrently with listing. See Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F.Supp.
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oped.267 As a result, NMFS decided that there was not time for compre-
hensive consultation on all federal actions, limiting many consultations to
1992 activities instead of addressing longer term management strategies.
Further, NMFS made no attempt to establish guidelines for consultation
based on the biological needs of the species, as required by the "jeopardy
standard. '' 26 8 Instead NMFS adopted a weak interim standard, stating
that "[u]ntil specific standards are determined through the recovery plan
process, the goal of all Federal agencies should be to improve survival and
make progress toward reversing the decline of listed and proposed
species." 2 69
Under this interim plan, NMFS did not require a numerical increase
in salmon survival; all it required was progress toward reducing mortality
from baseline levels.270 NMFS did develop estimates of the reductions in
mortality necessary to level the decline of the spring/summer and fall
chinook, estimating that reductions of 7.4 percent to 20.7 were needed for
the spring/summer chinook and 2.3 to 5.9 percent for the fall chinook,
2 71
but it did not require the reductions to be met in 1992.272
621 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (holding that failure to designate critical habitat for owl was arbitrary and
capricious). See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TYPES AND
NUMBER OF IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS 29 (May 8, 1992) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS]
(indicating that critical habitat has been designated for only 16 percent of listed species). Furthermore,
when critical habitat designation does occur, it involves consideration of economic factors. See 16
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1988).
267. Section 4(f) requires the Services to promulgate recovery plans for listed species unless they
find that a plan will not promote the conservation ofthespecies. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1988). However,
the approval of recovery plans runs considerably behind listing. The FWS has a goal of recovery plan
approval within 2.5 years after listing, but most plans take over 3 years, and recovery plans have been
approved for only 61 percent of listed species. See IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS, supra note 266, at 33-36.
268. See supra note 9.
269. Letter from Rolland A. Schmitten, Regional Director, NMFS, to Ernest J. Harrell, Corps
of Engineers, North Pacific Division 1-2 (Dec. 5, 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter to
Federal Agencies] (Announcing sockeye listing and presenting consultation requirements and
recommendations); FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 15. The adoption of this interim goal has
produced ongoing legal challenges by both industry and environmentalists. See Aluminum Co. of
America v. Franklin, No. CV-92-972FR (D. Or. filed Aug. 5, 1992) (arguing excessive emphasis on
hydroelectric operations); Northwest Resource Information Center v. NMFS, No. C92-1156 (W.D.
Wash. filed July 21, 1992) (arguing consultation and protection inadequate).
270. See, e.g., FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 16, 17. NMFS did not give a statutory
justification for its "improvement from baseline" approach, which appears to incorporate ongoing
operations, into the environmental baseline, see 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1992)("effects of the action"
definition), as if they were completed actions. However, this approach conflicts with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of section 7: "Under the Court's reasoning, the Act covers every existing federal
installation, including great hydroelectric projects and reservoirs .... The 'actions' that an agency
would be prohibited from 'carrying out' would include the continued operation of such projects or any
change necessary to preserve their continued usefulness." Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 203 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
271. See STABILIZATION REPORT, supra note 75, at 14.
272. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 17. However, the NMFS did state that "the greatest
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NMFS used estimated mortality under 1992 conditions and preexist-
ing management strategies as the baseline from which decreased mortality
was required . 7 Baseline periods differed from consultation to consulta-
tion, and even within consultations, according to data availability and
similarity of conditionsY.4 Notably, 1991 operations were excluded from
the baselines because of incomplete data and because of changes in
management strategies made in attempts to avert the proposed listing of
the salmon; therefore 1992 improvements over "baseline" mortality are
possible without making any improvements over 1991 operations or
mortality rates.275 NMFS even admitted that application of the interim
goal in subsequent years might not ensure the continued survival and
recovery of the species.2 76 Consequently, the Service suggested that it was
likely that "future standards will impose far more stringent requirements
than are necessary to achieve the 1992 interim goal. 21 77 But for 1992
operations, NMFS cited the "complexity of the species' life cycle, which
includes the presence of multiple age classes in a single spawning year" as
justifications for determining that actions conducted under the interim
goal would not jeopardize the continued existence of the species.2 78
The adoption of an interim standard, acknowledged by NMFS as
likely to be insufficient to reverse or even halt the decline of the species, 279 is
inconsistent with the ESA's implementing regulations and both the express
language and the intent of the ESA. Section 7 requires that, through
consultation, federal agencies "insure" that their actions are "not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence" of any endangered or threatened
species. 28° The intent of the ESA is to give endangered species the benefit ofthe doubt where agency actions might jeopardize the species.281 The
proportional improvements are expected of those activities with the greatest proportional take." Id. at
16.
273. See, e.g., FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 17; CRFMP OPINION, infra note 336, at 6.
274. See, e.g., FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 17-19 (baseline 1984-90 for juvenile passage,
1990 operations applied to 1928-78 runoff conditions for total juvenile mortality, 1975-90 for adult
passage); CRFMP OPINION, infra note 336, at 6 (baseline 1986-90 harvest rate).
275. See, e.g., FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 17-19; CRFMP OPINION, infra note 336, at
6.
276. See, e.g., FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 15-16.
277. Id. at 16.
278. Id. at 15-16. This reliance on the "complex life cycle" implied that 1992 losses would be
acceptable due to the fact that returning salmon would be spread out over several years and would be
mixed with salmon from other years, thus minimizing the effects of mistakes in 1992. However this
reliance on dispersed effects and mixture with other salmon is questionable in light of the extremely
depressed condition of the salmon stocks and low returns in recent years. See discussion supra section
11. B.
279. See, e.g., FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 50.
280. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
281. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 697, supra note 7, at 12.
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implementing regulations require a finding of jeopardy if an action is
expected to "reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and
recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction,
numbers, or distribution of the species. '"282
NMFS admitted that application of its interim 1992 goal may not
even level the decline of the listed species,2 83 indicating that further
reduction in both the numbers and reproduction of listed species may occur
as a result of 1992 operations. If this happens, it will appreciably reduce the
chances of survival in the wild for at least two of the listed species, the
sockeye and the fall chinook. By relying on the "complexity of each species'
life cycle" and the "presence of multiple age classes in a single spawning
year" 284 -in essence, the existence and eventual safe return of other
members of the species, currently either in emergency rearing programs, at
sea, or in the lakes and rivers-NMFS failed to give the listed species the
benefit of the doubt. It also ignored the fact that the regulations call for
survival in the wild,2 85 not mere survival.
In 1989 and 1990, the known sockeye return did not allow any
breeding. In 1991, sockeye breeding potential was minimal.286 Under these
circumstances, the reasonableness of NMFS reliance on future natural
returns to mitigate damage caused in the current year is questionable.2 87
The danger of immediate jeopardy is less severe for the chinook, because its
returns have not yet reached single digits; however, the fall chinook return
has already fallen to the point where long-term viability may be
threatened.288 At a minimum, NMFS should require sufficient progress in
reducing mortality to prevent any further decline of this species, not mere
progress toward reversing the decline. The purpose of consultation under
the ESA is to "insure" that federal actions are "not likely to jeopardize"
listed species, 89 not to merely reduce mortality. As the following discus-
sion of some of the consultations shows, progress under the interim goal of
282. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1992).
283. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 50.
284. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 16.
285. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1992)(definition of "jeopardize").
286. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 12 (returns of 0, 1, and 4).
287. Some of the endangered sockeye are being maintained in a captive rearing program, but
these fish cannot be relied upon because of the danger of genetic drift and catastrophic loss to disease or
system failure. See generally Michael L. Goodman, Preserving the Genetic Diversity of Salmonid
Stocks: A Call for Federal Regulation of Hatchery Programs, 20 ENVTL. L. 111 (1990).
288. See generally GRANT G. THOMPSON, NMFS, DETERMINING MINIMUM VIABLE POPULA-
TIONS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (199 1)(indicating that minimum viable population to
maintain genetic variability is generally believed to fall within the range of 1,000 and 10,000 adults).
See also Endangered and Threatened Species; Endangered Status for Winter-Run Chinook, 57 Fed.
Reg. 27,416, 27,421 (1992) (proposed June 19, 1992) (indicating that for fish with a three to five year
life cycle, annual runs of 200-500 adults are needed to avoid loss of genetic diversity).
289. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988). See also supra note 9.
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NMFS has been inadequate to insure that "jeopardy" is not likely to occur.
B. Operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System
Consultation on the 1992 operation of the Columbia River Power
System (FCRPS) began on December 20, 1991. NMFS combined formal
consultation on the Snake River sockeye, which had been listed one month
before, and a formal conference on proposed species for the Snake River
spring/summer and fall chinook.290 NMFS issued a final biological/
conference opinion on April 10, 1992, twelve days before the Snake River
spring/summer and fall chinook were listed as threatened species.
1. Proposed FCRPS Activities
The FCRPS Opinion covered the 1992 operation of the FCRPS by the
Corps of Engineers (COE), the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA),
and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). This opinion covered the operation
of all federal dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers, including the eight
mainstem dams through which migrating Snake River salmon must
pass. 9 The activities proposed for 1992 consisted of baseline operations
with modifications to enhance salmon survival. The baseline used for
juveniles was based primarily on 1984-1990 operations, but the base
operations were applied to historical runoff conditions outside of the
baseline period.29" The baseline for adults consisted of operations from
1975-1990.293 NMFS admitted that baseline operations of the FCRPS
were a significant factor in the decline of the listed salmon and were likely
to jeopardize the species.2 9 Nevertheless, consultation focused only on
changes made in baseline operations,2 95 including reservoir drawdowns
and flow augmentation, a water temperature control experiment, a
predator control program, increased law enforcement, changes in opera-
tion and maintenance, and changes in spill. Most of the changes were
proposed by the action agencies, but significant changes such as increased
290. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 3, 11. A conference opinion can be adopted as a
biological opinion when a proposed species is listed. See supra note 265.
291. See supra note 65 (listing of dams).
292. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 17-19.
293. Id. at 19.
294. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 17. See also STABILIZATION REPORT, supra note 75, at
3, 5, 14 (indicating that chinook populations are currently declining at approximately 25 percent per
generation, and that improvements ranging from 2.7 to 20.7 percent are needed in each of five life
stages of the salmon, and showing three phases for which hydropower may be a significant factor:
presmolt mortality, downstream passage, and upstream passage).
295. Baseline operations essentially mean the continuation of business as usual under prelisting
management strategies. Under the NMFS interim goal, focus was on "improvements" from this
baseline instead of on the adverse effects of operations. This approach is not justified by ESA or its
regulations. See supra notes 270, 275 and accompanying text.
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spill and flow augmentation were added during the consultation process.296
2. Effects of FCRPS Activities
NMFS evaluated the effects of the 1992 operations in terms of
changes relative to effects of pre-1991 baseline operations based on
analysis of years for which similar conditions or appropriate data ex-
isted. 297 Because of the nature of available data, NMFS used operations
during different time periods as baselines for estimating the effects of
operations on adults, juvenile travel times, and total juvenile mortality.298
Many of the estimated changes are qualitative because of inadequate
data.299
The FCRPS plan called for reservoir drafting and flow augmentation
to reduce juvenile migration time. The plan directed the COE to draft the
four lower Snake River reservoirs to near minimum operating pool (MOP)
for the period from April 1 through July 31, and to draft John Day
Reservoir on the Columbia River to the extent possible without reducing
agricultural pumping capacity.300 The plan also called for augmenting
flows from upstream reservoir releases by varying amounts depending on
runoff conditions, with the effect of producing higher flows throughout
more of the juvenile migration period than would be provided under
baseline operations. NMFS estimated that the FCRPS plan would
increase average flow during the peak of the sockeye and spring/summer
chinook juvenile migration, April 10 to June 20, by 6.6 percent on the
Snake River, from 60 kcfs under baseline operations to 64 kcfs, and by 9
percent on the Columbia River, from 209 kcfs to 228 kcfs.3 1 Similarly,
flows on the Snake River would be increased during the peak of fall chinook
migration in July from a baseline of 20 kcfs, by either 32.5 percent, to 26.5
kcfs, for 31 days, or by 67 percent, to 33.4 kcfs, for 15 days. 0 2 However,
during the majority of the period of sockeye and spring/summer chinook
juvenile migration, these increases result in flow levels amounting to less
than 46 percent of the flows recommended by the CBFWA on the Snake
river, and just 76 percent of recommended flows on the Columbia River.
Similarly, the brief highest flow periods during the peak of fall chinook
juvenile migration would only reach either 24 percent or less than 31
296. See FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 2.
297. See supra note 270, 275 and accompanying text.
298. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 17-19. See also supra note 275 and accompanying text.
299. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 17-19.
300. Id. at 4. "MOP" is "the minimum elevation of the established normal operating range of a
reservoir." FLOW MEASURES, supra note 122, §§ 11-5. The COE expected that the effect on
agricultural pumping would be substantially below 4.5 feet above MOP. Id. §§ 4-141.
301. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 21.
302. Id. at 23-24.
19931
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
percent of the minimum flows recommended for the entire migration
period.3 03 Further, because of the acceptance of normal pre-1991 operat-
ing conditions as the baseline, 04 combined with low 1992 runoff condi-
tions, the resulting flows are even short of the average flows that have been
provided in recent years, 0 5 which NMFS previously recognized as
inadequate. 0 6
NMFS expected a number of other changes in operations to have
significant effects, including increased spill at Ice Harbor and Lower
Monumental Dams above the baseline levels required by the 1989 Fish
Spill MOA. 07 NMFS expected these increases to increase fish passage
efficiency (FPE) 08 at the dams by up to 26 percent, thereby reducing dam
passage mortality significantly. NMFS also expected an extended season
during which migrating smolts would be collected and transported to the
Lower Columbia by barge or truck to significantly reduce fall chinook
mortality because the Service believes that under current low flow
hydropower system conditions, losses associated with transport are lower
than those associated with river migration.309 NMFS also expected the
salmon to benefit from programs to reduce squawfish predation, increased
law enforcement efforts to prevent illegal fishing, installation of wires over
fishways to prevent bird predation, and hiring of biologists to monitor
juvenile bypass facilities.
NMFS evaluated the combined effects of these actions using both
quantitative and qualitative factors, and stated that determination of the
combined effects was "ultimately a matter of judgment."310 For juveniles,
303. See FLOW PROPOSAL JUSTIFICATION, supra note 101, at 44. See also supra text
accompanying note 107.
304. See supra note 270, 275 and accompanying text. NMFS applied recent operating
conditions as the baseline despite the fact that in recent years flows have been manipulated to provide
higher flows in the fall and winter when power demand is greater, resulting in lower spring and summer
flows than historical flows under similar runoff conditions. See FLOW PROPOSAL JUSTIFICATION, supra
note 101, at 50.
305. Spring flows on the Snake River will be only 71 percent of the recent average, and spring
flows on the Columbia will be 97 percent of recent average. See FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 21
(stating that during the April 10 to June 20 period between 1984-90 average has been 90 kcfs on the
Snake River and 235 kcfs on the Columbia River). Further, the expected Snake River summer flows
during fall chinook juvenile migration are lower than during any of the periods for which NMFS has
data on the flow/travel time relationship. Id. at 24.
306. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
307. However, increased spill was not certain under the FCRPS plan because the spill provision
was limited by'a statement that the spill would be provided only so long as it "does not cause nonpower
impacts and BPA agrees to the power loss." FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 9.
308. "FPE" is the percentage of fish avoiding passage through the dam's turbines. The NMFS
estimates that turbine passage can cause 10 to 19 percent mortality and that the maximum mortality by
other means of passage is 4 percent. Id. at 38.
309. Id. at 19, 25-28.
310. Id. at 39.
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NMFS used modeling to produce numerical estimates of mortality using
baseline and 1992 operations, but the model did not take into account all
qualitative factors, and NMFS admitted that the results were not
precise.311 For both adults and juveniles of all species the NMFS concluded
that some decrease in mortality, from that under baseline conditions,
would result from 1992 action modifications, but indicated that the
magnitude of the decreases could not be precisely determined.
312
NMFS did develop some numerical estimates of changes in mortality,
but these changes may not satisfy either section 7(a)(1)'s duty to conserve
listed species or section 7 (a)(2)'s duty to not jeopardize listed species. The
figures indicate that juvenile mortality at baseline operations would be 71
percent for sockeye, 91 percent for fall chinook, 70 percent for spring
chinook, and 73 percent for summer chinook.313 Modeling showed im-
provements of 1.7 percent for sockeye, 9.1 percent for fall chinook, 2.4
percent for spring chinook, and 1.9 percent for summer chinook. Even with
the improvements in operations, juvenile mortality remained staggeringly
high: 69 percent for sockeye, 82 percent for fall chinook, 67 percent for
spring chinook, and 71 percent for summer chinook.
31 4
NMFS estimated adult baseline mortality from causes other than
legal harvest at 18 percent for sockeye, 69 percent for fall chinook, and 35
percent for spring/summer chinook.315 NMFS estimated a 3.2 percent
improvement for fall chinook adults, reducing mortality to 66 percent, but
for the other species NMFS could only predict "some decrease in
mortality." 318 The issuance of a "no jeopardy" opinion despite these
extremely high mortality rates and small improvements appears inconsis-
tent with NMFS' nearly simultaneous determination that in order to level
the decline of the species, at each life stage, improvements of 2.3 to 5.9
percent were needed for fall chinook, and 7.4 to 20.7 percent for spring/
summer chinook.317 Further, NMFS stated that "the greatest proportional
improvements are expected of those activities with the greatest propor-
tional take,"3 18 making its "no jeopardy" opinion even more inexplicable.
These small improvements were improvements only over baseline
operations; in other words, over what would happen during 1992 if business
311. Id. at 43.
312. Id. at 42-47.
313. Id. (rounded to nearest percent).
314. Id. (rounded to nearest percent).
315. Id. at 29, 42-46 (including fallback, delay, and illegal harvest mortality)(rounded to
nearest percent).
316. Id. at 43-46.
317. See STABILIZATION REPORT, supra note 75, at 14.
318. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 16.
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was conducted as usual.3 19 NMFS considered baseline operations "likely
to jeopardize the continued existence" of the salmon;320 these operations
contributed to the current status of these species, and to the current annual
five to six percent reduction in chinook populations. 321 In addition, NMFS
acknowledged that 1992 runoff would be below normal, and that salmon
survival could be low in 1992 due to drought conditions. 22 Thus, the 1992
improvements approved in NMFS' biological opinion on FCRPS opera-
tions may result in no numerical increase in survival when compared to the
actual numbers of salmon surviving in past years, making it clear that the
baseline used does not reflect the biological needs of the salmon. NMFS
has expressed concern that "if the proposed actions were continued beyond
1992, in conjunction with similar mortality reductions in other life history
phases, it would not be sufficient to level the decline of all three species in
one generation," and that "[c] ontinued population declines would jeopard-
ize the continued existence of the species." 323 In these circumstances, it is
difficult to see how NMFS or the federal action agencies responsible for
FCRPS operation could rely on small improvements from an artificial
baseline to fulfill the ESA's mandate to "insure" that federal actions are
not likely to jeopardize listed species.
3. Incidental Take Guidelines
When a "no jeopardy" opinion is given to an action which will involve
the "take" of listed species, the Services must include an incidental take
statement in the biological opinion specifying the amount of take that is
authorized and imposing conditions to minimize take. 24 NMFS could not
determine the precise number of Snake River salmon that would be taken
by FCRPS operations, but it developed quantitative estimates and in-
cluded these in an incidental take statement for FCRPS operations. These
estimates stated that passage mortality of adults, from causes other than
legal harvest, should not exceed 18 percent for sockeye, 35 percent for
spring/summer chinook, and 66 percent for fall chinook. Expected
maximum passage mortalities for juveniles were 69 percent for sockeye,
68-71 percent for spring/summer chinook, and 82 percent for fall
319. See supra note 270, 275 and accompanying text.
320. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 17.
321. See STABILIZATION REPORT, supra note 75, at 3.
322. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 50.
323. Id. at 50 (emphasis in original). Even a leveling of the decline of the species in one
generation would result in a smaller population than the present one because initial returns would not
experience all of the improvements (i.e., salmon already at sea have already experienced two life stages
in which improvements were not made). See STABILIZATION REPORT, supra note 75, at 1.
324. See supra note 21.
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chinook.325 These estimates assumed that FCRPS operations would
conform to an incidental take statement requiring operations to be carried
out in accordance with the terms of the consultation and the resulting
incidental take statement.
NMFS included a number of reasonable and prudent measures to
minimize incidental take, along with general and site specific terms and
conditions in the incidental take statement. These reasonable and prudent
measures included: (1) modifying structures and operations at dams and
bypass facilities to minimize mortality of juveniles and adults; (2)
expanding juvenile and adult monitoring programs to determine effects of
activities; (3) conducting a predator management program that would
minimize incidental take of salmon; and, (4) increasing law enforcement to
reduce poaching and studying the effects of this program on salmon
survival.32 Although these measures may seem substantial, the terms and
conditions implementing them make it clear that the term "minimize
' '8 7
actually only meant "reduce." The actual terms and conditions did not
place a heavy burden on the action agencies, as most involved minor
"housekeeping" details such as keeping fish screens and passage facilities
clean and operational, monitoring salmon migration, developing new
monitoring methods, and operating squawfish elimination devices in a
conscientious manner.3 28 However, some of the terms and conditions had
the potential to affect FCRPS operations. For example, in addition to
requiring spill according to the Fish Passage Plan (FPP),3 29 they also
required the operation of turbines to be within one percent of peak
efficiency, prohibited the operation of unscreened units during the fish
passage season, and required the shutdown of units when screens or
gatewells were not cleaned. 3
30
4. Conservation Recommendations
In its biological opinion on FCRPS operations, NMFS also suggested
a number of discretionary "conservation recommendations.
s33 1 Most of
these measures centered on research aimed at reducing mortality in future
325. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 63. "Take" of listed species by federal agencies is only
authorized if it is consistent with the terms of an incidental take statement. See supra note 21.
Reinitiation of consultation is necessary if "take" exceeds that authorized in an incidental take
statement. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(4) (1992).
326. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 63-71.
327. "Minimize" means "to reduce to the smallest possible amount or degree." WEBSTER'S
ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 912 (1989 ed.).
328. FCRPS OPINION, SUPRA note 65, at 63-72.
329. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, FISH PASSAGE PLAN FOR 1992 (March 1992).
330. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 63-68.
331. See supra note 151.
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years, developing integrated life cycle models for the salmon, and formu-
lating a biologically-based performance standard against which hydro-
power operations could be measured. B3 However, some measures poten-
tially capable of immediate implementation were also included in the
recommendations, including purchasing additional water for flow aug-
mentation, acquiring spare parts to minimize down time for fish passage
facilities, and improving survival of transported juveniles through mea-
sures reducing loading stress and holding times.333
C. Salmon Harvest Opinions
NMFS conducted a number of consultations on various 1992 harvest
activities, including inriver fisheries under the Columbia River Fishery
Management Plan (FMP), the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska Groundfish
FMPs, Indian Ceremonial and Subsistence Fisheries (C&S Fisheries),
and salmon harvesting under the FMP off the coasts of Washington,
Oregon, and California.334 Many of these were informal consultations and
did not result in biological opinions,3 35 but those consultations which did
result in biological opinions serve to illustrate how the NMFS handled the
harvest issue. 3 6
NMFS applied its interim goal "to improve survival and make
progress toward reversing the decline of listed and proposed species" with
improvement expressed in terms of decreased mortality instead of in-
creased survival.33 7 NMFS used the period of 1986-1990 as the baseline for
comparison, primarily because of data availability and because manage-
ment during that period was representative of current management
332. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 51-56.
333. Id.
334. See NMFS, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS I 992SPRING/SUMMER
CHINOOK FISHERIES OF THE SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES I (June 29, 1992) [hereinafter BIA
OPINION] (describing consultations that had been conducted and were in progress).
335. Formal consultation is not required, if, following informal correspondence and communi-
cation with the Service, an action agency determines that the action is not likely to adversely affect a
listed species or critical habitat, and the Service gives a written concurrence. See 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.14(b)(1) (1992).
336. See, e.g., NMFS, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON 1992 SUMMER AND FALL FISHERIES CON-
DUCTED UNDER THE COLUMBIA RIVER FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN AND 1992 MANAGEMENT
AGREEMENT FOR UPPER COLUMBIA RIVER FALL CHINOOK (June 12, 1992) [hereinafter CRFMP
OPINION]; NMFS, ADDENDUM TO BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR 1992 SUMMER AND FALL FISHERIES
CONDUCTED UNDER THE COLUMBIA RIVER FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN AND 1992 MANAGEMENT
AGREEMENT FOR THE UPPER COLUMBIA RIVER FALL CHINOOK SALMON (June 30, 1992) [hereinafter
CRFMP ADDENDUM]; NMFS, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE 1992 FISHERIES CONDUCTED UNDER
THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE SALMON FISHERIES OFF WASHINGTON, OREGON, AND
CALIFORNIA (May 1, 1992) [hereinafter PFMC OPINION].
337. See, e.g., CRFMP OPINION, supra note 336, at 6 (quoting letter from Rolland Schmitten,
NMFS Northwest Regional Director, to federal Agencies (Dec. 5, 1991)).
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principles." 8 NMFS acknowledged that in order to level the decline of the
species, 3 9 reductions in mortality of 7.4 to 20.7 percent were needed at
each life stage for spring/summer chinook, and that reductions of 2.3 to 5.9
percent were needed for fall chinook, but these figures were not treated as
requirements. 310 Despite the fact that NMFS determined that the loss of
even one adult sockeye could jeopardize the species, NMFS only required a
reduction in mortality.341
Regulating harvest of individual stocks of salmon is difficult because
many stocks are in the harvest areas concurrently. Moreover, current
knowledge and technology do not always allow the singling out of a specific
stock for protection while allowing other similar stocks in the same area to
be harvested. NMFS estimated the risk of catching a listed species by using
hypergeometric distribution, 342 or by finding the historical percentage of
catch in a given area and applying the percentage to the projected total
1992 catch. 43 None of the 1992 salmon harvest consultations resulted in a
jeopardy opinion, and nearly all the consultations anticipated significant
reductions from the 1986-1990 baseline mortality, primarily due to
reductions in harvest rates. 44 Some of these reduced harvest rates were
largely due to constraints on harvest unrelated to the ESA,3 5 and others
were due to proposed harvest rates below those allowed under existing
management plans.346 However, NMFS indicated that comprehensive
consultations on management strategies would be necessary once a
recovery plan is developed.347
338. See, e.g., PFMC OPINION, supra note 336, at 8; CRFMP OPINION, supra note 336, at 6.
339. See supra note 323.
340. See, e.g., CRFMP OPINION, supra note 336, at 6.
341. Id.
342. See, e.g., id. at 8. The hypergeometric distribution method used by NMFS involved
estimating the total run size, and the run size of the listed species. Then NMFS determined the
mathematical probability of catching one or more of the listed species at given catch levels. NMFS
estimated a total sockeye run size of 50,000 and a Snake River sockeye run of 8, and produced
probabilities ranging from 0.02 for a catch of 100, to 0.39 for a catch of 3,000. Id. at 8-9.
343. See, e.g., PFMC OPINION, supra note 336, at 8-11.
344. See, e.g.,id. at 10 (40 percent reduction in exploitation of fall chinook); CRFMP OPINION,
supra note 336, at 19-20 (22.3 percent reduction in spring/summer chinook harvest and 74.7 percent
reduction in fall chinook harvest). But see BIA OPINION, supra note 334, at 6, 11 (harvest of 56 spring/
summer chinook allowed as incidental take to catch of 220 salmon despite absence of baseline catch for
comparison).
345. See PFMC OPINION, supra note 336, at 14 (concerns over Klamath River fall chinook).
346. See, e.g., CRFMP OPINION, supra note 336, at 18-20. Many opinions were issued late, or at
the last possible minute after extended negotiation. Thus, the consultation requirement was probably
the primary cause of decisions to forego harvest. See, e.g., id. at 1-2 (Opinion issued June 12 for fishery
scheduled to start on June 1). NMFS claimed time pressures constrained the scope of consultations,
and chose not to use consultation to address the underlying management plans which served as the
baseline for consultation and which allowed for higher harvest levels. See supra note 265 and
accompanying text.
347. See, e.g., Letter from William W. Fox, Jr., NMFS Director, to Phillip Anderson, PFMC
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Despite the fact that none of the biological opinions found jeopardy,
many of the harvest activities involved "incidental take" of listed spe-
cies.34' Thus, NMFS was able to impose mandatory "reasonable and
prudent measures" in incidental take statements. However, most of these
measures and the terms and conditions implementing them were not very
restrictive. For example, NMFS authorized the ocean fishery to take
"unspecified numbers" of spring/summer and fall chinook, subject only to
a measure requiring management consistent with the action agency's
preseason plan and continuation of sampling of fisheries to facilitate a post-
season analysis of impacts by NMFS. 4 9 Similarly, so long as expected
incidental take was not exceeded, the CRFMP incidental take measure
required only inseason management consistent with preseason harvest
objectives and continued monitoring sufficient to provide statistically valid
estimates of the numbers and species composition of salmon caught.350
However, the incidental take statement did set levels of take below the
levels which would normally have been allowed under the CRFMP. Since
individual stocks could not be identified and treated separately, incidental
take was expressed as total numbers of fish allowed, or as percentages of the
total run. 51 No take of Snake River sockeye was directly allowed, but in
one opinion allowing 3.1 percent of the total sockeye run to be harvested,
NMFS acknowledged that there was a probability of 0.22 percent that one
or more Snake River sockeye would be taken. 52
D. Implications of the Salmon Consultations
If the NMFS goal of simply reducing mortality from levels at baseline
operations was acceptable, the NMFS consultations on FCRPS operations
and harvest activities would have to be considered marginally successful.
ESA consultation produced substantive changes in dam operations and
Chairman, (May 1, 1992) (accompanying biological opinion) (indicating that interim plan was a
stopgap measure, and stating that recovery plan will consider all sources of mortality and measures
needed to ensure survival and recovery).
348. Harvest, might appear to involve "purposeful" rather than "incidental" take, but under the
current regulations, an action constitutes "incidental take" if it results from, but is not the purpose of,
an otherwise lawful activity. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1992). Thus, where the target of harvest is another
nonlisted salmon stock, an action would still constitute an "incidental take" and the more stringent
requirements for a "purposeful take" in section 10 of the ESA would not be implicated. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539 (1988). See also Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon: A History of Failure and a
Dubious Future, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 667, 702 (1991-92) (explaining requirements for permits for
purposeful take).
349. PFMC OPINION, supra note 336, at 15-16.
350. CRFMP OPINION, supra note 336, at 23-24.
351. See, e.g., id. at 24 (using different methods for different fisheries and stocks).
352. CRFMP ADDENDUM, supra note 336, at 4-5. See also supra note 342 (hypergeometric
distribution used for determining probability).
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harvest levels, both through concessions made by action agencies desiring
"no jeopardy" opinions and through incidental take limitations imposed by
the NMFS. These changes in operations and harvest levels will benefit the
listed species. However, the consultations do not seem to satisfy section
7(a)(2)'s standard that federal agencies "insure" that their actions do not
jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species because, instead of
considering the biological needs of the species, NMFS required only
improvements from an artificial "baseline" of the harm that the species
would sustain if previous management policies continued unchanged.
The NMFS did not expressly mention economic or political implica-
tions of its opinions, but obviously these impermissible factors played a role
in the 1992 "no jeopardy" decisions. NMFS determined that baseline
operations of the FCRPS were "likely to jeopardize the continued
existence" of the salmon, 53 yet gave 1992 operations a "no jeopardy"
opinion despite the fact that the proposed flow improvements of seven
percent on the Snake River and nine percent on the Columbia River during
the critical juvenile spring/summer chinook and sockeye migrations
resulted in lower than average flows and flows far short of those considered
biologically sound by the CBFWA.3 54 Further, the FCRPS action was
structured to minimize impacts to other uses, as illustrated by the fact that
reservoir drawdowns were limited by irrigation impacts355 and increased
spill at Columbia River dams was to be provided only so long as it "does not
cause nonpower impacts and BPA agrees to the power loss. ' ' - 51 Requiring
mortality reductions measured against what would have resulted from past
operating conditions or harvest levels is inherently flawed because de-
creases from an artificial "baseline" level of mortality are meaningless if
the "improved" action results in a decrease in the numbers of a listed
species, as was likely under 1992 drought conditions. 57
V. CONCLUSION
This examination of biological opinions issued by the NMFS on the
Snake River salmon and by the FWS on the northern spotted owl makes it
clear that consultation under section 7 of the ESA presents no absolute bar
to major federal actions, despite acknowledged harm to listed species. In
the case of the owl, the FWS issued numerous "no jeopardy" opinions for
timber harvest despite widespread violation of the 50-11-40 rule, 358 which
353. FCRPS OPINIo N, supra note 65, at 17.
354. See supra notes 301, 302 and accompanying text.
355. FCRPS OPINION, supra note 65, at 4.
356. Id. at 9 (quoting FPP, supra note 329, at 1).
357. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
358. See, e.g., supra notes 201, 242 and accompanying text.
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it acknowledged to be a critical component of the only existing credible
long-term conservation strategy for the owl.3 59 The FWS also allowed
actions to proceed despite "take" of hundreds of owl pairs through
destruction of habitat.3 60 In the case of the salmon, NMFS accepted small
improvements from an artificial "baseline" of mortality that would occur if
past management strategies were continued,36 1 despite the fact that
resulting flow conditions did not even approximate the biologically-based
recommendations of the CBFWA,3 6' and despite NMFS' concern that the
changes would be insufficient to "level the decline" of the salmon."'s
NMFS' "baseline" approach, which appears to be a product of political
expediency with no statutory basis, 64 ignored the biological needs of listed
species and allowed NMFS to issue a "no jeopardy" opinion for FCRPS
operations despite the fact that (1) there was no expectation of increased
numerical survival;36 5 (2) only minimal changes were made in opera-
tions; 66 and, (3) expected mortality rates remained as high as 66 percent
for adults and 82 percent for juveniles.367 Clearly, the ESA does not
prevent all harm to listed species.
Section 7's mandate requires the action agencies to "insure" that their
actions are not likely to jeopardize a listed species.368 However, when faced
with potential political repercussions,369 the Services appear reluctant to
issue a "jeopardy" opinion unless clear scientific evidence exists indicating
that an action is likely to cause irreparable harm to a species' chances of
survival. 70 Unwilling to declare jeopardy, the Services' attempts to protect
listed species through other means, such as conditions imposed on permits
for "incidental take,"37' as well as through warnings in strongly worded
discretionary "conservation recommendations. ' 7 Thus, while the section
7 consultation requirement has not directly blocked many federal actions,
it has resulted in extensive Service involvement and monitoring of the day-
to-day operations of other federal agencies. While this oversight has
359. See, e.g., BLM 1991 OPINION, supra note 137, at 18-21.
360. See, e.g., supra notes 144, 170, 225 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 270, 275 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 270, 275.
365. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 314, 316 and accompanying text.
368. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
369. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
370. The Services are effectively reversing the statutes' burden, and this approach receives some
support from the current regulations despite the fact that it conflicts with legislative history. See supra
note 9.
371. See supra note 21.
372. See supra note 151.
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achieved some piecemeal species protection, it has also produced uncer-
tainty, delay, and frustration among federal agencies and those who
depend on their actions.
The consultation process of the ESA is currently not achieving
adequate species protection, is resulting in economically crippling uncer-
tainty, and has resulted in seemingly endless legal challenges to agency
actions. In this context, the consultation process might easily be considered
"broken," and revision of the statute might be encouraged by agencies and
industries desiring both greater certainty and less intrusive measures, and
by environmentalists desiring greater species protection.
However, the efficiency and reliability of the consultation process can
be improved without making major changes in the statute. The consulta-
tion problems are not due to the text of the ESA, but to the failure of the
Services and federal action agencies to seriously attempt to fulfill their
statutory responsibilities and to use the current statutory framework
effectively. The efficiency and reliability of the consultation process could
be greatly improved through changing the section 7 implementing regula-
tions to more closely reflect the ESA's purpose, and through increased use
of "jeopardy" opinions combined with subsequent reliance on the exemp-
tion process. Further improvements could be made through increasing
public participation and through increased reliance on programmatic
consultations involving agency management strategies instead of individ-
ual actions or groups of actions for a single year. Although these changes
could be instigated by the Services, rapid and efficient adoption with a
minimum of legal challenges would require congressional action.
A. Regulatory Imbalance
The ESA's implementing regulations currently overemphasize action
agency independence and underemphasize the ESA's overriding goal of
species protection. This imbalance is primarily seen in the definitions of
"jeopardize," and "destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat,"' 73 and in the "minor change rule"' 74 which limits Service ability
to require mitigation. But this overemphasis on action agency discretion is
also evidenced by the absence of language giving the Services the ability to
require consultation or to define the scope of consultation. When the
implementing regulations were amended in 1986, the Services stated
clearly in the preamble of the new regulations that consultation was not
intended to "establish substantive policy for federal agencies." 75 If the
373. See 50 C.F.R § 402.02 (1992). See also supra notes 9 and 266.
374. See supra note 21.
375. See Interagency Cooperation Final Rule, supra note 12, at 19,928.
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Services used their remaining discretion aggressively, effective protection
of listed species would be possible within the bounds of these regulations.
However, the current regulations allow the agencies and Services to avoid
immediate political repercussions at the expense of species protection and
long-term efficiency.
While courts have recognized that the duty to avoid actions "likely to
jeopardize" a listed species takes priority over the "primary missions" of
federal agencies,3 76 neither the action agencies nor the Services seem to
recognize this priority. The federal action agencies view the ESA as an
obstacle to avoid instead of as a goal to achieve.3 77 Furthermore, the
Services appear reluctant to require modifications in the basic manage-
ment strategies of other agencies in the face of strong political opposition,
the possibility of adverse economic consequences, and the weakly asserted
Service authority under current ESA regulations.3 78
The ESA requires that agencies "insure" that their actions are not
likely to jeopardize a listed species, and the Act's legislative history
indicates that listed species are to be given the benefit of the doubt, 79
making it clear that the burden is on the action agency to "demonstrate to
the consulting agency that its action will not violate section 7(a)(2)." 0
Despite the ESA's mandate, the Services and the current regulations give
action agencies the benefit of the doubt, and jeopardy opinions are only
issued when the Services find that an action "is likely to jeopardize" a listed
species. This conflicts with the ESA's mandate, and as a result, the action
agencies have little incentive to adopt protective long-term management
strategies. Under the current regulations, species protection is reduced to a
patchwork of "take" restrictions, even when programmatic changes in
management strategies are needed and available. A new rule making is
needed to extend Service authority explicitly to the management strategies
of federal agencies and to make express the Act's intent to place the burden
on the action agencies to demonstrate that their actions will not jeopardize
listed species.
376. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978): Sierra Club v. Marsh,
816 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987). The duty to avoid "jeopardy" is different from the duty to
"conserve" where courts have found greater agency discretion. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of
Indians v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1416-19 (9th Cir. 1990).
377. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 301 (9th Cir. 1992) (FS at-
tempted to argue that ESA listing relieved it of the duty to manage for spotted owl viability under
NFMA). See also supra notes 185, 219 and accompanying text (BLM attempts to reduce scope of
consultation to evade reasonable and prudent measures).
378. This reluctance is illustrated by the fact that the FWS allowed the BLM to consult on
individual sales (although FWS did treat the sales as interrelated) and to systematically violate the 50-
11-40 rule. See, e.g., supra note 201 and text accompanying note 242.




B. Increased Reliance on the Exemption Process
The owl and salmon consultations indicate that the consultation
process is not functioning as Congress intended, at least not where federal
operations of immense political and economic importance are involved.
Political and economic considerations have no place in the making of a
"jeopardy" or "no jeopardy" decision. The 1978 ESA amendment provid-
ing an exemption procedure was intended, in part, to result in flexibility
which would discourage political decisions by the Services, since Congress
believed that "[t]hose individuals charged with the administration of the
act do not have the legal authority to weigh the political importance of an
endangered species." '' Decisions involving consideration of political and
economic factors are particularly inappropriate in the consultation process
because consultation is not a public process, and the results of consultation
are not easily accessible by the public. Further, self-imposed regulatory
limitations on Service authority, preventing the Services from considering
alternatives that are inconsistent with the intended purpose of the action or
which are outside the jurisdiction of the action agency, 382 and which limit
the Services' ability to require mitigation measures to minor modifica-
tions,38 3 may inhibit the Services from prescribing alternatives and
mitigation measures that clearly prevent jeopardy. These regulatory
restrictions may also prevent the development of efficient solutions which
may be outside the recognized authority of the action agency.
Congress created an exemption procedure which allows for the
weighing of political and economic concerns because it anticipated that
some federal actions would jeopardize the existence of listed species.3 84
Unlike consultation, the exemption procedure is publicly accessible,
involves an exploration of all alternatives, and is an appropriate forum for
consideration of political and economic effects. However, the ESA exemp-
tion process has been largely ignored; exemptions have only been sought on
six occasions, and on three of those occasions the process was dropped
before completion.38 5 Those who argue that the ESA does not allow for the
weighing of economic and social costs can do so only because neither the
Services nor federal action agencies have been willing to rely on the
exemption process. For the ESA to function as Congress intended, the
Services must issue a "jeopardy" opinion whenever a federal action agency
381. H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 8, at 13.
382. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, 402.14(h)(3) (1992).
383. Id. §§ 402.02, 402.14(i)(2).
384. H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 8, at 13.
385. Exemptions have been granted in two of the three cases where the process was pursued to
completion. See IMPLEMENTING ACTIoNs, supra note 266, at 37-38. See also BLM Exemption, supra
note 222, at 23,405.
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cannot meet its burden of showing that its proposed action "is not likely to
jeopardize" a listed species. The action agencies may then seek exemptions
for actions involving benefits which outweigh species costs.
386
Although reliance on the Endangered Species Committee creates a
danger that a particular species, or subpopulation of a species, may be
knowingly sacrificed, it also presents the possibility of an efficient resolu-
tion either barring the action entirely, or allowing the action but requiring
extensive permanent mitigation measures and management changes.
3 87
Further, if the Services were more willing to issue jeopardy opinions, action
agency opposition to the delay, public scrutiny, and uncertainty of the
exemption process might prompt action agencies to adopt sound long-term
conservation strategies instead of catering to the political expediency of the
moment.
C. Programmatic Consultation
Case by case consultation creates both uncertainty for action propo-
nents and inadequate protection for listed species. The Services should
have express authority to demand programmatic consultation on entire
management plans instead of consultations on individual actions or groups
of actions. This power is arguably present under the ESA and its current
regulations. 38 8 However, the Services have been reluctant to require
formulation of new management strategies in the context of consulta-
tion.389 Programmatic consultation, combined with periodic revisions and
continued monitoring by the Services would allow individual actions to
proceed without further consultation, absent discovery of significant new
information. Although delays could result from requiring programmatic
consultation because the official adoption of new management strategies
might require compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act, 90
386. However, exemptions must be sought on a programmatic basis if real results are to be
achieved. The BLM's attempts to seek exemptions on individual sales, although partially successful,
indicates the futility of such an approach. See BLM Exemption, supra note 222, at 23,405.
387. See, e.g., id. at 23,408 (allowing 13 of 44 sales to proceed but requiring adoption of
conservation strategy). Delays due to use of the exemption process should not exceed 190 days. See 16
U.S.C. §§ 1536(g)-(h) (1988). The "minor change rule" of the current regulations prevents the
Services from requiring similar mitigation and management changes, see supra note 21, and the
Services are required to protect the "distribution" of the species under the regulations definition of
jeopardize, thus limiting the potential for compromise. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1992).
388. See Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 294 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that management strategy is "agency action" and that under the regulations the action agency must
consult on any action "at the earliest possible time."). See also 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (1992).
389. Even the new draft recovery plan which recognizes the value of and encourages
programmatic consultation, would allow agencies to conduct case by case consultations which could
undermine recovery efforts. DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN,supra note 30, at 128-29. See also supra note 375
and accompanying text.
390. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370 (1988). See, e.g., Seattle
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these delays are warranted in light of the goals of the ESA and the
irrevocability of species extinction. Further, delays due to NEPA compli-
ance would be more predictable and possibly shorter than current delays
which result from successful legal challenges to ill-planned agency actions.
Express Service authority to demand programmatic consultations would
make the action agencies more accountable for their actions, and would
remedy the current situation where the refusal of one federal agency to
conduct programmatic consultation can invalidate the management strat-
egies of other federal agencies, as occurred when the BLM refused to adopt
the ISC strategy and sought exemptions from jeopardy determinations.39'
D. Increased Public Participation
Much of the current controversy surrounding the ESA is an indirect
result of the fact that the consultation process is subject to almost no public
review. This hidden process has enabled the Services and action agencies to
engage in political maneuvering and bargaining, often resulting in short-
term compromises without adequate regard for long-term effects. This
process allows the Services to avoid political fire by not issuing "jeopardy"
opinions and the action agencies, by acquiescing to Service terms and
conditions, to pursue activities without exposing their agency to the public
scrutiny that would be required for either adopting new management
strategies or using the ESA exemption process. The public is thus largely
unaware of the extent of harm that the Services are allowing the action
agencies to inflict upon listed species and of the extent of action agency
resistance to the ESA's mandate. As a result of this lack of information,
large segments of the public view the conditions which the Services do
impose on agency actions as excessive and consider legal challenges to
agency actions which have received "no jeopardy" opinions to be harass-
ment by environmental plaintiffs.
The Services and the action agencies could be made more responsible
and accountable by introducing a greater degree of public participation
and notification. Greater reliance on programmatic management strategy
consultations will allow direct public participation in the NEPA process,
but consultation needs to be more public as well. Direct public participa-
tion through notice and opportunity to submit written comments, such as
that provided under section 10(c) for private "take" permits,3 92 may be
impracticable due to the sheer volume of federal actions. However, it would
Audubon v. Moseley, No. C92-479WD, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12,500, at *28 (finding FS
management strategy in violation of NEPA due to shortcomings of Environmental Impact Statement,
partially due to BLM exemption).
391. See Seattle Audubon v. Moseley, No. C92-479WD, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12,500, at *28.
392. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(c) (1988).
1993]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
not be impracticable to require notice that consultation has been requested
and publication of a summary of the results of consultation, along with
instructions for obtaining copies of complete biological opinions. Further,
where programmatic consultations are involved, it would be practicable to
allow for written comments and a public record, just as is now done when
private "take" permits are sought.
Other studies have shown that consultation usually offers rapid,
efficient, and minimally restrictive resolution to conflicts between listed
species and federal actions.3 93 But, in the cases of the owl and the salmon,
the process has failed to resolve the conflicts in an economically, politically,
or ecologically sound manner. This failure might suggest that section 7 of
the ESA is in need of revision. However, closer analysis indicates that the
statutory framework of the ESA is adequate; all that is really needed is for
the Services and action agencies to accept their statutory responsibilities
and to properly use their authorities under the current statute. Congres-
sional prodding may be necessary in order to instigate changes in Service
and action agency policies, but this can be accomplished without major
revision of the ESA or of the consultation process.
393. See, e.g., IMPLEMENTING AcTiONS, supra note 266, at 30-32.
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